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Abstract
Tampering of biometric samples is becoming an important security concern. At-
tacks can occur in behavioral modalities (e.g. keyboard stroke) as well. Besides
biometric data, other important security concerns are related to network traffic
data on the Internet. In this thesis, we investigate the application of Power laws
for biometrics, forensics and network traffic analysis.
Passive detection techniques such as Benford’s law and Zipf’s law have not been
investigated for the detection and forensic analysis of malicious and non-malicious
tampering of biometric, keystroke and network traffic data. The Benford’s law
has been reported in the literature to be very effective in detecting tampering of
natural images.
In this thesis, our experiments show that the biometric samples do follow the
Benford’s law; and that the highest detection and localisation accuracies for the
biometric face images and fingerprint images are achieved at 97.41% and 96.40%,
respectively.
The divergence values of Benford’s law are then used for the classification and
source identification of fingerprint images with good accuracies between the range
of 76.0357% and 92.4344%.
Another research focus in this thesis is on the application and analysis of the
Benford’s law and Zipf’s law for keystroke dynamics to differentiate between the
behaviour of human beings and non-human beings. The divergence values of the
Benford’s law and the P-values of the Zipf’s law based on the latency values of
the keystroke data can be used effectively to differentiate between human and
non-human behaviours.
Finally, the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law are analysed for TCP flow size difference
for the detection of malicious traffics on the Internet with AUC values between
the range of 0.6858 and 1. Furthermore, the P-values of the Zipf’s law have also
been found to differentiate between malicious and non-malicious network traffics,
which can be potentially exploited for intrusion detection system applications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Digital tampering is becoming more rampant recently because of the easy ac-
cess to digital processing tools such as Photoshop [6]. The most common ma-
nipulations that can likely be applied to raw biometric data (e.g. face image)
include: copy-paste manipulation which has an inserted region that is uncom-
pressed, but the composite raw biometric image is saved in a Joint Photographic
Expert Group (JPEG) format; copy-paste manipulation which has an inserted
region that is compressed and the composite raw biometric image is saved in a
JPEG format; and inpainting manipulation of JPEG raw biometric image [3]. It
is noted that JPEG is the most widely used image format [3]. It is also used as
a storage format for raw face images, fingerprint images, vein wrist images and
iris images. Another concern of biometrics is related to biometric sensors arising
from replay-attack and print-attack, which are all spoofing approaches to fool
biometric sensors, thus resulting in sensor tampering [7].
Biometrics can be defined as a set of automated methods used for the recog-
nition of human beings, measuring and analyzing statistically their distinctive
physical and behavioral traits [2]. Biometric modalities consist of face, finger-
prints, iris, retina, teeth, hand geometry and skin when considering biological
measurements, whereas when considering behavior information, the data consist
of voice, gait, keyboard stroke, signature or other written scripts [2]. Biologically
measured modalities (fingerprints, face, hand geometry, iris) and/or behavioral
modalities (voice, signature, keyboard strokes) are used for biometric recognition
purposes [8]. The recognition is carried out either for verification or identifi-
cation [8]. Verification (1-to-1 matching) seeks to answer the question “Is this
person who they say they are ?”. Whereas identification (1-to-many (n) match-
ing) seeks to answer the question “Who is this person ?” or ”Who generated this
biometric ?” [9].
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Even though biometric systems have advantages, they are exposed to several
attacks that may cause security concerns. Ratha et al. [1] noted that there are
eight possible attack points in a generic biometric system as shown in Figure 1.1.
These possible attacks on biometric systems are: (1) Fake biometric at the sen-
sor; (2) Resubmission of old digitally stored biometric signal; (3) Override feature
extract; (4) Tampering with the feature representation; (5) Override matcher; (6)
Tampering with stored templates; (7) Channel attack between stored templates
and the matcher; (8) Decision override.
Sensor
Feature extractor
Matcher Template database
6
7
Decision
4
2
3
1
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Figure 1.1: Eight possible attack points in a generic biometrics-based system [1]
Biometric templates can be stored either locally or remotely in a database. Ac-
cording to Bouridane [10], the maintenance of template data store or template
database has frequently been overlooked. The raw biometric images are mainly
stored for research and development applications whereas the feature sets are
used for real-world application purposes [10]. The stored raw biometric data
can be exposed to digital manipulation by attackers. As such, there is a need
to analyse and confirm the authenticity of these data. Although there are ap-
proaches [11] [12] proposed to detect and localise natural image tampering, such
techniques are not focused on raw biometric images. For instance, Huynh et.
al. [11] carried out a survey on natural image forgery detection techniques focus-
ing on copy-move and splicing images. Qazi et. al. [12] carried out a survey on
several blind techniques used in detecting natural image forgery. They focused on
copy/move, splicing and retouching forgery detection techniques. We are there-
3fore concerned with analysing raw biometric images to protect against malicious
tampering of stored raw biometric templates.
Both biologically measured and/or behavioral modalities are used for recogni-
tion purposes, they both have advantages and disadvantages. For instance, in
terms of the advantages, biologically measured modalities (e.g. fingerprints, face
and iris) remain unchanged for a longer period of time as compared to behavioural
modalities. They are also very unique and have high recognition accuracy [13].
The disadvantage of these modalities (especially fingerprints) is that when they
are exposed to hackers, it is not possible to change them. Therefore, it is diffi-
cult for these modalities to be revocable when compromised. The disadvantage
associated with iris is that it has a low acceptance from the public due to how
interfering the iris scanning process is carried out [13]. In contrast, behavioral
modalities (e.g. keyboard stroke) are very economical and can easily be inte-
grated into existing computer security systems. They can also be changed on a
regular basis and can be cancelled even when exposed to hackers [13]. Behavioral
modalities can also be used to potentially differentiate between keystrokes data
generated by humans and non-humans.
Keystroke dynamics has been used to discriminate between individuals [4] [14]
[15], on-line banking application [16], static authentication [17], and continuous
authentication [18]. However, these keystroke dynamics can be attacked by vari-
ous means such as human [4], synthetic and automatic attacks and forgeries [19].
In order to discriminate authentic keystrokes from keystrokes originating from
synthetic forgeries or impostors, different methods have been proposed. Some
of these methods use machine learning techniques [4] [19] [20] to discriminate
authentic keystrokes from synthetic forgeries or impostors which are data depen-
dent. Keystroke auditing or inspection is divided into active monitoring and pas-
sive protection [21]. In active monitoring, administrators watch ongoing keystroke
activities whereas, in passive protection, stored keystroke data are usually exam-
ined for audit purposes [21]. Keystroke auditing has two issues, which handle
the large amount of data generated and privacy [21]. However, for an organisa-
tion/company that handles sensitive data, these two issues could be handled by
providing sufficient storage space for the data captured and by ensuring such a
company/organisation has proper policies in place and the employees are already
aware of such policies [21] [22]. Keystroke monitoring is generally considered as
a special case of audit trails [22] which is very important for forensic analysis, to
protect systems and data from intruders [22].
It is reported [2] that the fields of biometrics and forensics can benefit from
each other. Forensic science is defined as the body of scientific knowledge and
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technical methods used to analyse and interpret traces, in legal and criminal
processes for investigations [2]. The steps involved in a forensic process include
crime scene investigation, trace analysis, evidence interpretation and case report-
ing. The forensic science inferences are usually considered at the source level,
activity level and offence level [2]. The origin of the trace is the focus when con-
sidering source level inference, whereas when considering the activity that leads
to the existence of a trace, it is referred to as activity level inference and lastly,
when an offence is the focus, it is classified as offence level inference [2]. In this
thesis, we are more concerned with the offence level inference (detection of digital
tampering of raw biometric data and detection of keystrokes data generated by
non-humans).
Besides biometric data (biologically measured and behavioral modalities), other
important security concerns are related to network traffic data on the Internet.
The emergence of networking technologies has brought about easy and afford-
able connection to the Internet [23]. The Internet has been used for different
purposes and has advantages such as online banking, online shopping, communi-
cation and for research purposes. Internet acceptability has brought about sig-
nificant increase in the amount of information for data transmission and storage.
This information transmitted over the Internet has to be secured [24]. Network
intrusions, however, pose the main challenge to securing information on the In-
ternet [25] [26]. In order to defend against network attacks, there is a need for
studies relating to network traffic analysis. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
are used in detecting attacks or abuse on the Internet [27]. Identifying and re-
sponding to intrusions targeted at computing and network resources is the major
objective of IDS [28]. IDS systems are basically classified into signature or misuse
detection system, anomaly detection system and hybrid or compound detection
system [29]. A signature or misuse detection system recognises attacked data
based on a presumed set of attack signatures. Whereas anomaly detection system
creates a standard profile for what is considered a normal system. Any deviation
from this standard profile is considered a possible intrusion. A combination of
signature detection system and anomaly detection system is considered as hybrid
or compound detection system. Network traffic data if properly processed, could
serve as evidence to tackle network offenders [30].
There are methods proposed to detect natural image forgery [11] [12], discrimi-
nate authentic keystrokes from synthetic forgeries or impostors [4] [19] [20], and
detect anomalies on the Internet [31] [32]. However, the attackers are constantly
evolving and are able to bypass many of the existing methods. In this thesis, we
propose the use of Power laws for the detection of malicious attacks in biomet-
ric, forensic and network traffic data. A quantity is said to follow a Power law
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when the probability of measuring a particular value of some quantity varies in-
versely as a power of that value [33]. Two Power laws are analysed in this thesis:
Benford’s law and Zipf’s law. There exists a relationship between Benford’s law
and Zipf’s law which in most cases exhibit a power law like behaviour for most
quantities considered [33] [34]. Chapter 2 gives more details about the Benford’s
law and Zipf’s law.
1.1 Research Goal, Motivation and Questions
In this thesis, the application of Power laws will be investigated for the detec-
tion and forensic analysis of malicious and non-malicious tampering of biometric,
keystroke and network traffic data. Passive detection methods [3] [35] [36] have
been developed to verify the authenticity and integrity of natural images. Li et
al. [3] used the first digits of the alternate current modes and support vector
machine (SVM) for the detection and localisation of tampered regions in natural
images. Al-Qershi and Khoo [35] described copy-move detection methods used for
natural image authentication. Bianchi et al. [36] discriminated original regions
of natural images from forged regions based on a statistical test. They used the
hypothesis that original regions of natural images are doubly compressed whereas
that of the tampered regions are singly compressed. Although these techniques
are proposed for verifying the integrity of natural images, they are not studied
considering raw biometric images. Also, proposed techniques to tackle intrusions
over the Internet and aid in monitoring keystroke data for forensic analysis can
be bypassed by attackers.
It is therefore very important to develop effective techniques to address chal-
lenges such as differentiating between tampered and un-tampered raw biometric
data, keystrokes generated by humans and those originating from synthetic forg-
eries or impostors, as well as detecting intrusions on network traffic data. The
importance of verifying the authenticity and integrity of biometric data cannot be
over emphasized. Biometric modalities are possessed by almost every individual.
As such most countries keep individuals biometric data either for verification or
identification. Biometric data such as fingerprints and photographs are used by
most countries to prevent identity fraud and help in tracing criminals. However,
hackers may illegally have access to these sensitive biometric data. Ratha et al.
[1] noted that templates stored in the database could be modified or removed, or
new templates introduced in the database. This could cause illegal authorization
of a fraudulent individual, or denial of service for the legitimate person whose
template sample was modified. Therefore, there exist some real cases of digital
tampering with biometric data in real-world applications. For example, a case
in point, was the nine million stolen records of Israelis’ biometric information
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which shocked the world in 2006, from the Israel’s primary national biometric
database [37].
To the best of our knowledge, research has not been carried out in verifying
the integrity, authenticity and reliability of raw biometric modalities using Power
laws. In the case of keystroke data, most computers in an organisation use key-
boards for login purposes. As such, it is important to differentiate authentic users
from impostors. Otherwise, the impostors will succeed in posing a challenge of
exposing or having illegal access to sensitive information.
Lastly, if a network is not protected from network intruders, it will result in non-
secure transactions and open to attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS). There are also methods [38] [39] developed for network traffic analysis.
Drasˇar et al. [38] carried out a flow-based anomaly detection review. They also
proposed a new network anomalies taxonomy and a classification of flow-based
detection methods based on similarity-orientation. Sperotto et al. [39] detected
anomalies in network traffic based on flow-based time series. The motivation of
this thesis is based on these challenges explained above with the goal of inves-
tigating how to analyse raw biometric data, keystroke data and network traffic
data using Power laws for both security and forensic purposes. To achieve this
goal, the following fundamental research questions will be investigated and anal-
ysed in detail in this thesis:
Research question 1: Do biometric images follow Benford’s law? If yes, can
Benford’s law assist in detecting and localising tampered biometric images?
Research question 2: Is Benford’s law and Zipf’s law applicable to the latency
or duration of keystroke data? How will they behave for the Benford’s law and
Zipf’s law?
Research question 3: Is Benford’s law and Zipf’s law applicable to the TCP
flow size difference of network traffic data? If yes, can they assist in detecting
malicious traffic in the Internet?
1.2 Research Methodology
In this thesis, raw biometric images will be investigated to determine whether
they follow Benford’s law or not. The Benford’s law is also referred to as the first
digit law. Any deviation from the Benford’s law could indicate that such raw
biometric images have been tampered with. The probability distribution of first
digits of the block-Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients of raw biometric
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coloured face images and biometric grayscale fingerprint images is performed to
test whether they follow standard Benford’s law. We then analyse the probabil-
ity distribution of first digits of the JPEG coefficients to determine whether they
also follow generalized Benford’s law.
We use divergence metrics based on Benford’s law to assist in separating differ-
ent fingerprint images. In addition, the first digits of the alternate current modes
and support vector machine are used to detect and localise tampering in raw
biometric images.
Furthermore, we investigate keystroke dynamics by checking the conformity of
keystroke data to these Power laws. A deviation could mean that an abnormal
keystroke data is generated which could be from non-humans or impostors and
hence there will be a need for a further investigation by the system analyst. We
use latency, keydown-keydown and duration of keystroke datasets to test their
conformity to standard Benford’s law, generalised Benford’s law and Zipf’s law.
Lastly, we analyse network traffic data using Benford’s law and Zipf’s law to de-
tect normal and abnormal network traffic flows. We test whether non-malicious
flow size difference of network traffic data follow these Power laws and also
whether malicious flow size difference deviates from these laws.
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives
The aims and objectives of this thesis are as follows:
 Analyse raw biometric data and detect tampered data using Benford’s law
and metrics based on divergence and distances
 Investigate keystroke data using Benford’s law and Zipf’s law for keystroke
dynamics to discriminate between authentic keystroke data and those gen-
erated by non-humans or impostors
 Propose the use of Benford’s law and Zipf’s law to analyse network traffic
flow size difference for IDS based on divergence and distances
1.4 Contributions
The contributions in this thesis are mainly focused on statistical analysis of raw
biometric data, keystroke data and network traffic data. We are focused more on
passive detection methods rather than active detection methods.
The subsections below discuss each of our contribution briefly. Figure 1.2 shows
a hierarchical chart of digital image forensics, biometrics, network traffic analysis
and highlight the contributions of this thesis (in red shapes).
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Figure 1.2: Hierarchy of Digital Image Forensics, Biometrics, Network Traffic Analysis
with a highlight on the contribution of this thesis
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As shown in Figure 1.2, digital image forensics is divided into active forensic
techniques and passive forensic techniques. As noted in [3], attention should
be focused more on developing passive detection methods than active detection
methods. This is because passive detection methods do not require any prior
information about the image or quantity under investigation. In this thesis, we
focus and investigate the area of tamper detection, using pixel based methods,
which belongs to the passive forensics category. This is carried out in order to ver-
ify the integrity and authenticity of raw biometric images. Power laws (Benford’s
law and Zipf’s law) which are classified as statistical laws are investigated on bio-
metric images, physical and behavioral biometrics, and network traffic data for
network traffic analysis. The physical biometric traits that are investigated using
Benford’s law are face images and fingerprint images. Whereas for behavioural
biometric traits, the keystroke data is investigated using the Power laws. Lastly,
network traffic metric (flow size difference) is investigated using the Power laws.
1.4.1 Integrity of raw biometric images using Benford’s law
In this thesis, we propose the use of Benford’s law in investigating raw biometric
images. We analyse the block-DCT coefficients of uncompressed biometric im-
ages such as face and fingerprint images and show whether they closely follow the
standard Benford’s law and whether the JPEG coefficients of these images also
closely follow the generalized Benford’s law. We further investigate the novel use
of Benford’s law on biometric modalities such as face images and fingerprints to
determine whether such modalities are uncompressed or JPEG compressed im-
ages based on a DCT transformation. For detection and localisation of tampered
raw biometric images, we investigate the hypothesis whether the tampered re-
gion has undergone a single JPEG compression and the un-tampered region has
undergone a double JPEG compression [3]. This approach works considerably
better in detecting tampered raw biometric images. For the classification and
source identification of different types of fingerprint images considered in this
thesis, fingerprint images will be investigated using metrics from the Benford’s
law divergence values.
1.4.2 Integrity of keystroke data using Benford’s law and Zipf’s law
We seek to apply Benford’s Law and Zipf’s Law to keystroke data and to de-
termine whether they follow these laws. We further investigate whether these
laws can discriminate between humans using keystroke biometric systems from
non-humans. For the keystrokes data, we specifically investigate the latency and
the duration values of keystroke data from humans to see whether they follow the
Benford’s law and Zipf’s law. We perform experiments and comparative analysis
using the benchmark data set developed by Killourhy and Maxion, CMU [4]. We
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investigate whether the latency of keystrokes can be used as a feature for auditing
purposes to detect whether there exists anomalies during system logins by their
employees.
1.4.3 Network traffic data for IDS using Benford’s law and Zipf’s law
We propose the use of Benford’s law and Zipf’s law on the TCP flow size difference
to assist in detecting malicious traffic on the Internet. Experiments will be carried
out on non-malicious traffic (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)
and ICSI dataset, UNB ISCX 2012 Intrusion Detection Dataset, Traffic Lab at
Ericsson Research in Hungary (TLERH) dataset, Other publicly available non-
malicious traffic from Packet Capture (PCAP) traces [40]) will be analysed to
see whether non-malicious network traffic follows the Benford’s law and Zipf’s
law. Furthermore, experiments on malicious traffic (Capture hacker dataset, 2009
Inter-Service Academy Cyber Defense Competition (CDX) dataset, Mid-Atlantic
collegiate cyber defense competition (MACCDC) dataset, Labeled dataset for
intrusion detection, Kyoto University Benchmark Data) will be performed to
show whether malicious traffic deviates from the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law. We
will also investigate the Benford’s law to detect malicious traffic on labeled dataset
from (Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) Cup 1999 dataset [41],
NLD-KDD 2009 dataset [42] and a private dataset provided by Thales Research
& Technology (TRT) UK).
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1.6 Thesis Structure
The thesis is organised as follows:
 Chapter 2 describes the multimedia security domain, Power laws and the
relationship that exists between Benford’s law and Zipf’s law. We briefly
highlight the recent state-of-the-art techniques considering the area of bio-
metrics, forensics and keystroke dynamics. Next, we review network traffic
analysis and the state-of-the-art techniques used in the literature.
 Chapter 3 investigates the use of Benford’s law for biometric recognition
and their features to detect and localise tampered JPEG biometric images.
 Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of Benford’s law for physical bio-
metric traits. We use the Benford’s law divergence to detect different types
of fingerprint images. Next, the classification and source identification of
fingerprint images is achieved by using Benford’s law divergence.
 Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of Power laws for behavioural bio-
metric traits. Furthermore, Benford’s law and Zipf’s law are investigated
on the latency of keystroke data to discriminate between humans using
keystroke biometric systems from non-humans.
 Chapter 6 provides a detailed analysis of Power laws for network traffic
analysis. The TCP flow size difference is used with the Benford’s law and
Zipf’s law to assist in detecting malicious traffic on the Internet.
 Chapter 7 concludes and discusses future work in biometrics, forensics and
network traffic analysis.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The first part of this chapter explains the relationship that exists between multi-
media security, data hiding and forensics domains. Figure 2.1 shows a schematic
representation of the relationship that exists between multimedia security and
the forensics domain. The field of digital forensics which involves active and
passive detection approaches is reviewed. Figure 2.3 shows a schematic diagram
of image forensic techniques and highlights the relationship between the image
forensic techniques and the thesis chapters. One of the focuses of this thesis is to
verify the integrity of raw biometric data. In view of this, the field of biometrics
is reviewed and how digital tampering could occur in raw biometric data is also
explained. Furthermore, the field of biometrics and forensics benefit from each
other and are combined to form forensic biometrics. Forensic Biometrics is con-
cerned with the human-based automated methods used to analyse and interpret
biometric data within several forensic applications. Evidence which is obtained
from this field is useful for different purposes. Figure 2.4 shows the different uses
of this evidence and highlights the offence level as the area of focus in this thesis.
Also, Power laws are reviewed with a focus on image processing. Again, related
work on the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law with respect to keystroke dynamics
is reviewed. Lastly, network traffic analysis which is concerned with record-
ing, reviewing and analysing network traffic patterns using manual or automatic
methods is reviewed.
2.1 Multimedia Security
The field of digital multimedia security is concerned with protecting and vali-
dating multimedia content which includes video, image and audio. This field is
further divided into active and passive approaches. The schematic diagram of
digital multimedia security, digital forensics and the relationship that exists be-
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tween these fields is shown in Figure 2.1. The application of multimedia forensics
to an image is highlighted because one of our objectives in this thesis is focusing
on biometric images. The next section describes these approaches in details.
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Figure 2.1: Multimedia Security and Forensics
2.1.1 Active Approaches
Active detection methods work by embedding prior information (e.g. serial num-
ber) into an original media [43]. These methods include digital steganography,
digital watermarking and digital signatures. Active detection methods (digital
steganography and digital watermarking) are classified as data hiding techniques.
This is because both approaches are aimed at embedding data into a digital me-
dia. A closely related domain to the data hiding techniques is cryptography.
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Fields belonging to cryptographic domain include digital signatures and encryp-
tion. In this section, we describe in detail, the different types of data hiding
techniques.
Digital Steganography and Steganalysis
The history of steganography dates back to 440 B.C. when Histiaeus tattooed
a message on a trusted slave’s head after his hair was shaved [44]. When the
hair had regrown, the servant was used to communicate the tattooed message to
the desired destination without being noticed. Steganography embeds data into
a media and conceals the existence of the embedded data so that it will not be
detected by an attacker [44] [45]. As noted by Fridrich et al. [46], the purpose
of steganography is for secure communication. Fridrich et al. [46] detected the
least significant bit (LSB) steganography for both coloured and grayscale im-
ages. They determined that for a safe LSB embedding, an upper bound of 0.005
bits/pixel was needed. Wang et al. [47] proposed a steganographic algorithm
that could preserve the histogram of the cover images in the stego-images and
also addressed the minimization of visual distortions. Li and Li [48] proposed the
progressive exponential clustering steganographic method to increase the embed-
ding capacity which is achieved by avoiding redundancy.
Steganalysis is concerned with detecting steganographic methods. Goljan et
al. [49] proposed a colour rich model for detection of steganalysis for colour
images. Pevny` et al. [50] proposed a quantitative steganalyzer (which estimates
the number of embedding changes due to embedding operations) which could be
used as a blind detector. Sedighi and Fridrich [51] studied the effects of an im-
precise selection channel on steganalysis and showed that it was better to use an
imprecise selection channel instead of none. Furthermore, Shi et al. [52] proposed
a steganalysis scheme for detection of advanced JPEG steganography. They used
a Markov process based approach and showed that their proposed method out-
performed existing techniques in attacking OutGuess, F5 and MB1.
Digital Watermarking
In 1954, electronic watermarking was invented by Frank [53]. This was pub-
lished in the form of a patent that explained how to embed a code into music
in order to establish ownership. Frank [53] stated that “The present invention
makes possible the positive identification of the origin of a musical presentation
and thereby constitutes an effective means of preventing such piracy, that is, it
can be likened to a watermark in paper.” Digital watermarking as described by
Barni and Bartolini [54] is an information hiding approach that embeds digital
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information inside a carrier signal.
Generally, digital watermarking is classified into robust, fragile and semi-fragile.
Robust watermarking is used for copyright protection and verification of own-
ership of digital images. This watermarking approach is robust against signal
operations and deliberate attacks. Fragile and semi-fragile watermarking are
used for authentication of digital images. Any changes to the pixel values of
a watermarked image can be detected using a fragile watermarking approach.
Whereas, semi-fragile watermarking is used to verify contents that are tampered
within an image. This approach is more robust against attacks and is used for
verification of both malicious and non-malicious manipulations. The schematic
diagram for a generic watermarking algorithm is shown in Figure 2.2.
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The stages for watermarking systems generally include:
 Embedding: This stage embeds a watermark to indicate copyright
 Detection: This stage detects a watermark to prove ownership [55].
As shown in Figure 2.2, a watermark (W) is embedded inside an original digital
image using a key (K). Any modification to the watermarked image results to
a corrupted image. In order to verify the content of the received watermarked
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image by the receiver, the extraction of the embedded watermark is performed.
Using an extraction algorithm and key (K), the extraction process is performed
to determine whether the received watermarked image is original or modified.
When a received watermarked image is original (un-tampered), the embedded
watermark inside the image is unchanged, otherwise, the embedded watermark
has been modified.
Cox et al. [44] reviewed digital watermarking approaches. They noted that wa-
termarking could be used for copyright control, resistance to tampering and for
authentication. Barni et al. [56] presented a watermarking algorithm based on
the wavelet domain. Their proposed method masked the watermark by using the
human visual system characteristic. The maximum compression ratio the water-
mark survived was 50:1, 100:1 and 25:1 for the JPEG, SPIHT and Despeckle +
JPEG attacks, respectively. Also, the minimum size of the cropped area where
the watermark was found was 32 X 32 for the cropping attack.
Fragile watermarking algorithms can be traced back to Walton [57] whose algo-
rithm was based on inserting a checksum inside the least significant bits (LSB)
of an image data. On the other hand, semi-fragile watermarking algorithms have
been proposed by Lin and Chang [58], Ho et al. [59] and Zhao et al. [60]. Lin
and Chang [58] proposed a semi-fragile watermarking approach using a prede-
fined quality factor (QF) to authenticate JPEG visual content. Zhao et al. [60]
adopted the semi-fragile sine transform method of Ho et al. [59], which used the
slant transform.
In as much as active detection methods are useful, Li et al. [3] pointed out that
attention should be paid more to passive detection methods than active detection
methods, as passive detection methods do not require any prior information to
be embedded into an original image, which is an advantage over the active detec-
tion methods. However, the main focus of this thesis is not on active detection
methods but on passive detection methods. As such, active detection algorithms
are beyond the scope of this thesis. The next section reviews the state-of-the-art
passive detection methods.
2.1.2 Passive Approaches
In passive detection techniques, the underlying statistics of a tampered image
is considered to be different from that of an authentic image [6]. According to
Farid [6], Li et al. [61], Luo et al. [62] and Popescu and Farid [63], image forensics
techniques are generally classified into five categories as shown in Figure 2.3.
2.1. MULTIMEDIA SECURITY 17
 
Image 
Forensic 
Techniques 
Pixel-
based 
Cloning 
Re-
sampling 
Splicing Statistical 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 6 
Format-
based 
JPEG 
Quanti
zation 
Double 
JPEG 
JPEG 
Blocking 
Camera
-based 
Chromatic 
Aberration 
Color 
Filter 
Array 
Camera 
Respons
e 
Sensor 
Noise 
Physically
-based 
Light 
direction 
(2-D) 
Light 
Enviro
nment 
Light 
direction 
(3-D) 
Geometric
- based 
Princip
al Point 
Metric 
Measur
ements 
Figure 2.3: Classification of Image Forensic Techniques
Farid further explained the classification of image forensic techniques as follows:
 Pixel-based techniques: Statistical anomalies introduced at the pixel level
are detected using these techniques.
 Format-based techniques: Statistical correlations introduced due to the dis-
tinctive property of lossy compression scheme are used as an advantage
when considering these techniques.
 Camera-based techniques: Artifacts introduced by the camera lens, sensor,
or on chip post-processing are exploited when considering these techniques.
 Physically-based techniques: Modelling and detecting anomalies between
physical objects, light and camera which are usually in a three-dimensional
18 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
interaction are used when dealing with physically-based techniques.
 Geometric-based techniques: Measurements of objects, their positions in
respect to the camera is used for these techniques [6] [61] [63].
The application of pixel-based and format-based techniques for biometrics data
is one of our main objectives in this thesis. Over the years, these techniques have
been used successfully on digital images to detect tampering. Image tampering
via copy/paste (cloning) is commonly used to conceal an object of interest. This
form of image manipulation is pixel-based and efficient techniques have been de-
veloped to detect such manipulations [3] [64] [65]. Li et al. [3] combined machine
learning and statistical properties of the first digits based on JPEG coefficients
of individual AC modes to detect tampering in JPEG images. Fridrich et al. [64]
detected copy-move attack in digital images by exploiting the correlation exist-
ing between the segments of the original image and those of the tampered image.
Mire et al. [65] proposed the use of first two digit’s probability distribution to
detect tampering in JPEG images.
Another type of image tampering is performed by re-sampling the original image
onto a new sampling lattice to produce a convincing composite image [6]. How-
ever, the neighboring pixels usually contained specific periodic correlations which
resulted in detection [63]. Digital forensic techniques have also been developed to
detect this type of tampering [66] [67]. Mahdian and Saic [66] proposed a method
which could detect re-sampling and interpolation by using interpolated signals
and their derivatives. Qian et al. [67] proposed a rotation-tolerant re-sampling
detection method by measuring the distance that existed between two re-sampled
images.
Splicing is another form of pixel-based image manipulation, where two or more
images are spliced into a single composite to conceal the borders between the
spliced images, thus making it very difficult to be detected. Farid [6], Fu et
al. [68] and Zhao et al. [69] [70] have shown that splicing could be detected us-
ing the concept of disruptions in higher order Fourier statistics, Hilbert-Huang
transform, colour space and 2-D noncausal Markov, respectively. Iuliani et al. [71]
proposed an image splicing detection method that could work in a real world sce-
nario such as Facebook and Twitter. They noted that under such conditions,
the image under investigation goes through unknown processes apart from the
splicing manipulation. Schetinger et al. [72] showed that digital image forensic
techniques were capable of detecting advanced forms of image composition. By
advanced image composition techniques, they referred to areas such as computer
graphics, computational photography, image processing and computer vision that
could be used for the modification of an image.
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Interestingly, statistical features of natural images are different when compared
with tampered or manipulated images [3] [6]. A survey of statistical techniques
was performed by Farid [6]. He also showed how effective statistical features
could be used to detect manipulation or tampering in natural images. There has
been a continuous development concerning the use of statistical approaches in
detecting image manipulations. Huang et al. [73] applied the DCT on small fixed
size image blocks to detect duplicated tampered regions. However, this method
had a shortcoming if the tampered regions originated from a different image. Fu
et al. [5] used the quantized DCT coefficients to detect whether a bitmap image
had previously undergone JPEG compression. Stamm and Liu [74] proposed a
statistical method exploiting the difference in an image’s pixel value histogram,
between authentic and tampered image regions.
Format-based techniques use JPEG quantization as a clue to identify the source
device (camera make/model) of an image [6]. Double JPEG techniques are
format-based techniques which can be used to detect manipulations in images
due to the fact that the artifacts introduced in double compression are usually
different from those introduced in a single compression. He et al. exploited the
double JPEG technique [75] to detect the presence of these artifacts and used it
to localize tampering in natural images. Furthermore, Bianchi et al. [36] used an
improved DCT coefficient analysis to discriminate between original and forged re-
gions in JPEG images. JPEG blocking is a type of format-based technique that
uses the artifacts which usually appear at the border of neighboring blocks in
the horizontal and vertical axes. When an image is manipulated, these blocking
artifacts are usually disturbed [6] and such inconsistencies in blocking artifacts
are used to detect localized tampering. Primary quantization step (Q1) and the
portion of the modified region (α) are important parameters in separating a mix-
ture of modified and unmodified components of a tampered image based on DCT
coefficient analysis. Yu et al. [76] showed that these parameters (Q1 and α)
could be improved for image tampering detection when using DCT coefficients
for analysis. In Chapter 3, we investigate the use of Format-based techniques,
such as double JPEG compression and JPEG quantization for raw biometric data
verification.
Camera-based, physically-based and geometric-based techniques are camera de-
pendent. As such they will not be discussed in this thesis. One of our objectives
in this research is focusing on biometric data and whether these data may or may
not have information about the camera that captured them. In the next section,
we will discuss how digital tampering could occur in the biometrics domain.
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2.1.3 Biometrics and Digital Tampering
When considering feature-based approaches for face recognition, distinctive fea-
tures such as the eyes, mouth and nose have often been used [77]. Face recognition
algorithms rely mainly on facial properties. As such, the identification accuracy
of a tampered face image will not be the same as compared to an un-tampered
face image [78]. Dantcheva et al. [78] performed experiments to determine how
makeup face images affected the recognition accuracy of state-of-the-art recog-
nition algorithms. They investigated the difference of before and after the ap-
plication of makeup on a face image with respect to face recognition algorithms.
They concluded that altering a face image with cosmetics negatively affected the
recognition performance of the state-of-the-art algorithms.
Recently a number of active and passive forensic techniques have been applied to
detect tampering in biometric data. Anitha and Velusamy [79] showed that digi-
tal watermarking can be successfully used to detect tampering in biometric data.
They showed through experiments that this method achieved 100% accuracy in
detecting tampered watermarked biometric images. Ha¨mmerle-Uhl et al. [80] re-
viewed digital watermarking techniques and explained that digital watermarking
could be used for biometric sample tampering detection. Furthermore, Pankanti
and Yeung [81] showed that an invisible fragile watermarking technique could be
used to detect tampering in fingerprint images.
For the fingerprint modalities alteration, Yoon et al. [82] investigated obliteration
(abrading, cutting, burning, transplanting smooth skin and using strong chem-
icals), distortion (tips of fingerprints turned into non-natural format, removal
of fingertips skin, grafting etc) and imitation (remove part of the fingerprint
and stitch it in a different format). They detected such altered fingerprints by
analysing the ridge orientation field and minutiae distribution of the fingerprints.
They found that these alterations had a negative impact on the accuracy of the
NIST fingerprint image quality (NFIQ) fingerprint matcher. They showed that
by using NFIQ fingerprint matcher value of 5 to detect altered fingerprints, the
software had 31.6% true positive rate and 2.1% false positive rate. Feng et al. [83]
detected altered fingerprints based on ridge orientation and used real-world al-
tered fingerprints and synthetically generated fingerprints to demonstrate the
usefulness of their proposed technique. They showed that their proposed tech-
nique had a false alarm rate of 2% but detected 92% of the altered fingerprints.
They compared their detection rate to the NFIQ software and showed that the
NFIQ software detected only 20% of the altered fingerprints. Tiribuzi et al. [84]
used multiple kernel learning framework to enhance classification of altered fin-
gerprints using SVM. Their proposed method achieved a mean detection accuracy
of 90.4%.
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From our literature search, we observe that the altering of face images is mainly
performed with colouring or by using disguised appearance. Also, we observe
that many alterations have been carried out on a person’s fingerprint. In this
thesis, we will focus on various tampering attacks of a biometric image database
containing raw face images and fingerprint images. The reason for attackers to
tamper with biometric modalities is to cause a denial of service to the right person
or to implicate the wrong person.
2.2 Forensic Biometrics
Forensic biometrics dates as far back as the 19th century but was considered as
multiple different fields. Forensic anthropology was concerned with the analysis
of human skeletal remains resulting from unexplained deaths in a legal context [2].
Similar areas such as forensic dactyloscopy, which is a branch of forensics, con-
cerned with the scientific investigation of fingerprints and toe or foot prints to
identify the owner came into existence [2] [85]. Around the same time, French
description referred to as le portrait parl which was initially considered to be a
picture of a suspect in both front and profile views, but in recent times referred
to as mug shot of a suspect came into existence [86]. Until the 1960s, there came
the first application of forensic biometrics which was termed the automation of
identity verification on the basis of ten prints cards as identified by Berry and
Stoney in 2001 [87]. Meuwly and Veldhuis reported that forensic DNA profiling
was being used in the 1980s. Whereas in the 1990s, voice, face and gait recogni-
tion were of interest in the area of forensic biometrics [2]. In the same decade,
Champod and Meuwly proposed to combine biometric technologies and Bayesian
likelihood ratio inference model for evaluation of evidence [88].
Soft biometric modalities such as body measurements and proportions, gen-
der, hair, skin colour and clothing characteristics were used for forensics around
2002 [89]. Due to challenges of limited distinctiveness and stability of these uni-
modal features, multimodal approaches providing two or more modalities for ver-
ification/identification have attracted a significant amount of attention from the
research community [89]. Gofman and Mitra [90] showed that these approaches
achieved an increase in accuracy as compared to the unimodal approaches. They
performed experiments on unimodal features (face and voice) and multimodal ap-
proaches (score-level and feature-level fusion). They obtained an EER of 27.17%,
41.44% and 25.70% for the face, voice and score-level fusion, respectively. Fur-
thermore, they obtained an EER of 4.29%, 34.72% and 2.14% for the face, voice
and feature-level fusion, respectively. In 2011, Jain et al. [91] considered some of
the challenges of face recognition in forensics such as landmarks.
22 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The field of forensic biometrics has recently attracted much attention. As such,
the first international workshop on biometrics and forensics (IWBF 2013) was
held in Portugal. Over the last 3 years, the IWBF has produced important re-
search in the area of biometrics and forensics. For example, Vera-Rodriguez et
al. [92] and Tome et al. [93] have published papers in the IWBF that are rele-
vant to the contributions of this thesis. Vera-Rodriguez et al. [92] showed that a
higher level of variability was observed for landmarks located on the outer part
of the face as compared to landmarks located in the inner face. Also, Tome et
al. [93] extracted different facial regions to study their discriminative power in
a forensic scenario. They obtained an EER of 13.35%, 14.46% and 14.66% for
the full face region of 200 mixed subjects (100 males, 100 females), 200 female
subjects and 200 male subjects, respectively. Furthermore, they showed that the
nose region had an EER of 17.22%, 17.73% and 15.78% for 200 mixed subjects
(100 males, 100 females), 200 female subjects and 200 male subjects, respectively.
The IWBF runs every year and the technical programs cover physical biometrics,
behavioural biometrics and forensics domains.
Juneja et al. [94] in 2016 proposed the use of Ameloglyphics for person identi-
fication. Their method proposed that tooth prints might be useful for person
identification in harsh conditions. Such harsh conditions may occur when a vic-
tim is exposed to high temperature and acid. The reason for choosing tooth
prints is because it is resistant even when exposed to these harsh conditions.
Evidence acquired by combining biometrics and forensics is termed forensic bio-
metric evidence. Forensic biometric evidence can be used for intelligence, inves-
tigative and evaluative interpretation as shown in Figure 2.4. Trace analysis is
an important technique used to obtain evidence in biometrics [2]. Trace analysis
is carried out by extracting features from the test sample (trace) and the ref-
erence sample (database sample). A comparison between the features obtained
from the test sample against features obtained from the reference sample is car-
ried out. This comparison produces evidence that could be used as evidence in
a particular case under investigation [2]. Biometric traces are usually used in
intelligence interpretation to link forensic cases together. Furthermore, to select
a potential source of a biometric trace, an investigative interpretation is carried
out on the biometric trace under investigation and a rank list is produced [2].
Again, there is every need to estimate the value of the evidence either at the
source level, activity level or offence level. To achieve this process, the evaluative
interpretation of such a biometric trace is carried out [2]. Our focus in this thesis
is at the offence level as highlighted in Figure 2.4. Any alteration to this forensic
biometric evidence either intentionally or un-intentionally will have a significant
negative impact on forensic biometric evidence, which may lead to the evidence
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being void and unusable in the court of law.
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Figure 2.4: Uses of Forensic Biometric Evidence [2]
2.3 Power laws and Image Processing
According to Adamic [95], a Power law means small occurrences are extremely
common while large instances are uncommon. Pietronero et al. [96] showed that
the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law are both Power laws.
In this section we review the following:
 Derivation of the Benford’s law and image analysis.
 Benford’s law, other bases and scale invariance.
 Different transforms and the Benford’s law.
 Relationship between Benford’s law and Zipf’s law.
 Keystroke dynamics and relevant features.
 Network traffic analysis state-of-the-art
2.3.1 Derivation of the Benford’s law and image analysis
Berger and Hill [97] stated that the Benford’s law occurs when the distribution
of the first significant digit is not uniformly distributed but heavily skewed to-
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wards the smaller digits. They stated that the Benford’s law has the following
characteristics:
 a unique scale-invariant probability distribution
 a unique continuous base-invariant distribution.
These two characteristics will be explained in more details in Section 2.3.2. Berger
and Hill [97] and Fewster [98] argued that there was no clear and generally ap-
proved/accepted proof for the Benford’s law. Berger and Hill [97] stated that
“The widely phenomenon called Benford’s law continues to defy attempts of an
easy derivation.” They also noted that this law holds for real world distributions
that spans across several orders of magnitude. They concluded that “There is
no unified approach that simultaneously explains Benford’s law appearance in
dynamical systems, number theory, statistics and real-world data.” Also, Few-
ster [98] stated that “The ubiquity of Benford’s law especially in real-life data
remains mysterious.”
The derivation of this law and how it works can be expressed mathematically
as:
p(x) = log10(x+ 1) - log10(x)
= log10(
x+1
x )
= log10(1 +
1
x)
where the leading digit x = 1, ..., 9
When the distributions of the most significant digit (MSD) of logarithms of the
numbers are uniformly or randomly distributed, the Benford’s law can be ex-
pressed using the logarithm scale such that the space between x and x+ 1 on the
logarithm scale tallies with the expected Benford’s law probability values. This
implies that when considering values from 1 to 10 for a number say x, then for
a number to start with digit 1 means that 1 6 x < 2. In the same way, when
considering digit 9, it means 9 6 x < 10. When considering the log scale, this
implies log 1 6 log x < log 2 will obtain a digit that has the MSD as 1 and log 9
6 log x < log 10 will obtain a digit that has the MSD as 9. When the arithmetic
scale is compared with the logarithmic scale as shown in Figure 2.5, we see that
the blocks in logarithm scale are spaced differently as compared to the equally
spaced blocks of the arithmetic scale. One of the reasons for this can be explained
that the intervals between the digits are not the same in the logarithmic scale.
Whereas when considering the arithmetic scale, there are equal intervals between
the digits. Thus, when we consider an interval say [log 1, log 2] it gives [0, 0.3010]
as compared to an interval of say [log 9, log 10] which gives [0.9542425, 1].
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.5: (a) Arithmetic scale; (b) logarithmic scale.
This gives values of 0.30 for digit 1 and 0.05 for digit 9, which tallies with the
expected probabilities of digit 1 and digit 9 of the expected Benford’s law prob-
abilities.
Next, we review the investigation of Benford’s law for image analysis as shown
in Table 2.1.
2.3.2 Benford’s law, other bases and scale invariance
We further explain how the Benford’s law works with other bases, which explains
that this law is base invariance [97]. This law works for any base (k > 1).
However, the probabilities achieved in other bases (apart from base 10) tend to
follow a Generalised Benford’s law. Table 2.2 shows the probabilities for different
bases, with respect to the corresponding digit (d) in each case. This gives us a
clue as to why the Benford’s law is considered a natural law since it works when
considering other bases as well. To conform with the standard definition of the
Benford’s law, we use base 10 for our experiments throughout this thesis.
It is also reported that the Benford’s law is scale invariant [106]. This means that
the scale of measuring a particular quantity does not affect how the Benford’s
law works. Hill [107] showed that when distributions were randomly selected
in an “unbiased” manner and random samples were chosen from each of these
distributions, at any given time the first significant digits obtained from these
combined samples would follow a logarithmic pattern.
Other important issues about the existence of the Benford’s law are that it
can be applied to different cases such as geometric sequences, Lucas numbers,
prime numbers, logarithms of uniformly distributed random numbers, reciprocal
of Reimann zeta function zeros, finite Markov chains, expressions such as x ←
3x+1 (i.e. when x is a random number) [108]. However, there are cases where this
law fails. These include arithmetic sequences, US telephone numbers, sequences
that have bounded and restricted leading digits, as well as random numbers from
most common distributions [108].
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Year Technique (s)
(cited in)
Description Data Type Pros
2001 Jolion [99] Magnitude of the gradient of an im-
age follows the Benford’s law and also
the Laplacian decomposition of im-
ages follows this law.
images One of the fun-
damental work
in image anal-
ysis and Ben-
ford’s law
2005 Acebo and
Sbert [100]
synthetic images, when generated us-
ing physically realistic method, follows
the Benford’s law, but when generated
with different methods, does not fol-
low this law
images Benford’s law
applied to
synthetic and
natural images
2007 Gonzalez et. al.
[101]
Benford’s law applied to DCT trans-
form of images
images Fundamental
discovery in
terms of ap-
plying DCT on
images
2007 Fu et. al. [5] Detected unknown JPEG compression
using DCT coefficients and Benford’s
law
images Very useful in
process history
recovery
2009 Zhao et.
al. [102]
accurately detected the unknown QF
of semi-fragile watermarked image us-
ing the generalised Benford’s law
images an image foren-
sic technique for
semi-fragile wa-
termarking
2010 Qadir et. al.
[103]
used DWT coefficients for Benford’s
law on JPEG2000 images
images useful for pro-
cessing history
of images
2012 Li et. al. [3] used the MBFD features from the
Benford’s law with SVM for analysis
images useful for detec-
tion and local-
isation of tam-
pered images
2014 Iorliam et. al.
[104]
showed that authentic biometric im-
ages followed the Benford’s law
biometric im-
ages
useful for verify-
ing the authen-
ticity of raw bio-
metric images
2014 Iorliam et. al.
[105]
used the Benford’s law features with
SVM to detect and localise tampered
JPEG biometric images
biometric im-
ages
useful to ver-
ify the integrity
of biometric im-
ages
Table 2.1: Benford’s law analysis in images.
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d Base 2
(%)
Base 3
(%)
Base 4
(%)
Base 6
(%)
Base 8
(%)
Base 10
(%)
Base 12
(%)
Base 16
(%)
1 1.00 63.09 50.00 38.69 33.33 30.10 27.89 25.0
2 36.91 29.25 22.63 19.50 17.61 16.32 14.62
3 20.75 16.06 13.83 12.49 11.58 10.38
4 12.45 10.73 9.69 8.98 8.05
5 10.18 8.77 7.92 7.34 6.58
6 7.41 6.69 6.20 5.56
7 6.42 5.80 5.37 4.82
8 5.12 4.74 4.25
9 4.58 4.24 3.80
10 3.84 3.44
11 3.50 3.14
12 2.89
13 2.67
14 2.49
15 2.33
Table 2.2: Benford’s law probabilities for different bases.
2.3.3 Transforms and the Benford’s law
Different transforms such as DCT and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) have
been applied on natural images and it is shown that these transforms, when ap-
plied on uncompressed natural images, will also follow the Benford’s law.
The DCT is a transform in frequency space, which takes input signals as real
values. It is very useful when investigating lossy compression of images (e.g.
JPEG). A two-dimensional DCT is defined as shown in Equation 2.1.
C(u,v) = α(u)α(v)
N−1∑
x=0
N−1∑
y=0
f(x, y) cos
(2x+ 1)upi
2N
cos
(2y + 1)vpi
2N
, (2.1)
where 0 ≤ u, v < 8 and
α(u) =

√
1
N u = 0√
2
N u 6= 0
.
The DCT is used in many image processing applications including compression
(JPEG) because of the energy compaction in the lower frequency areas. When
used for JPEG, it achieves higher compression via the quantization and coding
process. It has been shown that both the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) coef-
ficients [109] and DCT coefficients [110] follow the Laplacian distribution. Again,
any distribution that follows the Laplacian distribution should follow the Ben-
ford’s law [111]. Furthermore, the DCT considers signals as a sum of cosine only,
thus, it makes use of inputs as real values, whereas the DFT generally considers
its inputs and outputs as complex values [112]. This reason may account for why
28 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
most of the Benford’s law papers have used DCT coefficients in image processing
applications [3] [5] [101] [104] instead of the DFT coefficients.
Another commonly used transform for the Benford’s law is the DWT [103] [113].
The DWT expands a signal based on wavelets. It works by carrying out a dis-
crete sampling of the wavelet signal typically using a Haar transform [114]. The
most commonly used version of the DWT is the Daubechies wavelet [115]. This
decomposes an image by using low-pass and high-pass filters with respect to the
image horizontal and vertical axes. The sub-bands for a one level transformation
are usually Low-Low (LL1), Low-High (LH1), High-Low (HL1) and High-High
(HH1). Due to the fact that the LL1 sub-band has the most energy, it can fur-
ther be decomposed as shown in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: 2 levels DWT decomposition
Qadir et al. [103] showed that the first digit probability distribution of the DWT
follows the Benford’s law when tested on 1338 grayscale images. When these
images were compressed with JPEG 2000 compression, glared images could be
isolated from non-glared images based on the first digit probability curve of the
DWT coefficients. Furthermore, Tong et al. [113] transformed an image using the
Haar DWT. The RGB colour channel of each sub-band was divided into a non-
overlapping 8 x 8 block-DCT. The MSD of the 3 DWT coefficients was calculated
based the Benford’s law. The standard deviation calculated from the absolute
difference of the 3 distributions of each wavelet sub-band was performed. Spliced
images were detected by comparing the standard deviation with a threshold.
It can be seen that the Benford’s law and DWT has been investigated for image
analysis. However, it is known that the cost of computing DWT is higher when
compared to the DCT. Also, DWT has a lower quality than JPEG at low com-
pression rates. Furthermore, DWT has a longer compression time as compared
to JPEG. As such, we use DCT transform on raw biometric images in this thesis
because of its popularity and its simplicity in terms of implementation. Next,
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we review how the Benford’s law has been investigated in different domains as
shown in Table 2.3.
Year Technique (s)
(cited in)
Description Data Type Pros
1881 Newcomb [116] First pages of the logarithmic table
worn more than the last pages
Natural num-
bers
Pioneer study
1938 Benford [117] 20,000 first digit from different
datasets showed a logarithmic be-
haviour
Different variety Rediscovered
and proved the
Benford’s law
1961 Pinkham [106] Benford’s law applies to numbers
whose distribution is scale invariant
numbers Benford’s law
characteristic
1978 Logan and
Goudsmit [118]
Tables containing random numbers
should follow the Benford’s law
random num-
bers
One of the first
Benford’s law
paper in physics
2002 Wallace [119] when mean of data > median and the
skewness is positive, such data will
likely follow the Benford’s law
numbers Worked well es-
pecially in cases
of datasets with
small values
2004 Durtschi et al.
[120]
Explained the effectiveness of the Ben-
ford’s law, when this law is useful and
when it is not useful
Accounting
records from a
medical center
Detected fraud
in accounting
data
1996 Hill [107] selected distributions in a random
(unbiased way) and when random
samples were selected from these dis-
tributions, the first significant digit
should follow the Benford’s law
numbers Benford’s law
characteristic
1995 Hill [121] Benford’s law holds for other bases as
well, except the bases gets too huge
bases of num-
bers
Benford’s law
characteristic
1996 Nigrini [122] Manipulated tax data deviates from
the Benford’s law, hence used for ac-
counting fraud detection
tax data Fundamental
research in ac-
counting fraud
detection
2014 Arshadi and Ja-
hangir [31]
Benford’s law holds for the inter-
arrival times of TCP flows for normal
traffic
inter-arrival
times
Useful for Inter-
net traffic analy-
sis
2014 Kreuzer et al.
[123]
Normal brain electrical activities anal-
ysed in form of signals follows the Ben-
ford’s law and a deviation could de-
tect sevoflurane-induced signal modu-
lations
EEG data diagnosis of
brain diseases or
false diagnosis
of brain diseases
detected.
2015 Golbeck [124] Online social network data follows the
Benford’s law and a deviation could
raise a suspicion
Facebook, Twit-
ter etc.
social media
analysis
Table 2.3: Benford’s law analysis in different domains.
2.3.4 Relationship between Benford’s law and Zipf’s law
The conditions that allow the Power laws to hold are discussed in Section 5.3.
Furthermore, we explain how these laws prove to fall under the family of Power
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laws. It has been proven empirically and mathematically that the Benford’s law
is an approximate of the Zipf’s law [96]. Also, any data set that fits the Benford’s
law should follow the Zipf’s law. Again, it is reported that the Benford’s law and
Zipf’s law are both scale-invariant [96].
When we consider a frequency f and a rank r, the Zipf’s law can be expressed
in the logarithmic format as:
log(f) = log(a)− blog(r) (2.2)
This means that this logarithmic can be expressed in any bases such as 10 or e.
By plotting log(f) vs log(r), a slope of -b is achieved as shown in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: log(f) vs log(r)
Therefore, we can say that the Zipf’s law is a Power law with an exponent, b=
-1. When considering the standard Zipf’s law, the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law
are compatible only when the Benford’s law alpha (α) =2. This means that the
Benford’s law with α > 1 can lead to a Generalised Zipf’s law with exponent of
( 11−α) [96].
We review how the Zipf’s law has been investigated in different domains as shown
in Table 2.4.
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Year Technique (s)
(cited in)
Description Data Type Pros
1935 Zipf [125] showed that given some corpus of
natural utterances, the frequency
of any word is inversely propor-
tional to its rank in the frequency
table
words Proposed the
Zipf’s law
1999 Manning and
Schtze [126]
a book on the basics of statisti-
cal language processing covering
Zipf’s law and an empirical eval-
uation of this law
words A detail expla-
nation of this
law is covered
in this book
and also noted
that this law is
a Power law
2005 Newman [33] explained the Power law (also re-
ferred to as Zipf’s law) mathemat-
ically as:
p(x) = Cx−α (2.3)
where p(x) is the distribution of
the quantity x, α is the exponent of
the Zipf’s law and C is a constant
several
datasets
provided
empirical evi-
dence for the
Zipf’s law
2009,
2012
Toa [127],
Christelli et
al. [34]
Both showed that there exists a re-
lationship between Zipf’s law and
Benford’s law
numbers and
words
very useful
proof in terms
of the rela-
tionship that
exists between
these two laws
2009 Clauset et. al.
[128]
provided a statistical framework
for discerning and quantifying
power-law behavior in empirical
data
several
datasets
Provided a
very helpful
tool in fitting
and testing
empirical data
on Power laws
2008 Huang et
al. [129]
used the Zipf’s law for fraud detec-
tion
KDDCUP’ 99
benchmark in-
trusion detec-
tion dataset
Used Zipf’s
law as an audit
tool to locate
a source of
suspicion
2012 Kalankesh et
al. [130]
Showed that Gene ontology fol-
lowed the Zipf’s law
Gene Ontology
database
used Zipf’s law
for gene analy-
sis
2015 Iorliam et. al.
[131]
Used the Benford’s law and Zipf’s
law for the analysis of keystroke
data to discriminate between hu-
mans using keystroke biometric
systems from non-humans
CMU
keystroke
database
Proposed
the use of
these laws
for keystroke
dynamics
Table 2.4: Zipf’s law application in different domains.
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2.3.5 Keystroke Dynamics and Relevant Features
The use of natural laws for keystrokes dynamics is explained in Section 5.2.
Keystrokes research has recently attracted a great deal of attention particularly in
the areas of static and continuous verification for authentication purposes. This is
due to the fact that there is a growing need for cyber security in computer or net-
work access control [132]. Keystrokes dynamics for authentication purposes dates
back to 1970’s [133] [134]. Most research activities depend on keystrokes features
such as duration, keyup-keydown (latency) and keydown-keydown [131] [132]
for authentication purposes. Reviews carried out by Leinonen et al. [135] and
Teh et al. [13] showed that the most common and stable feature used by most
researchers was latency. Chandrasekar et al. [136] showed that stochastic dif-
fusion algorithm could be used for authentication in keystroke dynamics. They
showed that their proposed method when applied to the duration and digraph of
keystrokes, achieved a false acceptance rate of 5.16%.
Leinonen et al. [135] showed that differentiating novice programmers from ex-
perienced ones could be achieved by their typing patterns. More recent research
carried out on sensor-enhanced keystroke dynamics showed that these keystrokes
were robust against statistical attacks [137]. In this thesis, we use the duration,
keyup-keydown (latency) and keydown-keydown features for our investigation.
2.3.6 Network Traffic Analysis State of the Art
In Chapter 6, we analyse the use of natural laws for network traffic analysis. The
main reason for doing so is to serve as an early warning against network attacks
such as DDoS, viruses, botnets and port scan attacks. Dubin et al. [138] showed
that encrypted adaptive video streaming could be classified. They performed
this classification using bit rates from an incoming video flow. They used the
k-means++ clustering technique for their classification and achieved an average
accuracy of 97.18%. This could be useful for network traffic analysis with a focus
on videos. Furthermore, Morgan et al. [139] analysed streamed data using an
adaptive artificial neural network. Their proposed method detected malicious
traffic from streamed data in the range of 90% or higher. Ahmed et al. [140] sur-
veyed network anomaly detection techniques. They pointed out some challenges
facing this research area. These included a lack of publicly available datasets and
a lack of universal anomaly detection technique. They also stated that the noise in
network traffic data that had been segregated, tended to be an anomaly [140]. In
this thesis, we also investigate the Power laws on network traffic data, specifically
focusing on the flow size as a metric which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
At this literature review and based on our current understanding, the use of
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Benford’s law and Zipf’s law was the first time that they have been used in
biometrics, network traffic analysis and keystroke data.
2.3.7 Anti-forensics and Anti-Anti-forensics
As techniques are developed for forensic analysis, attackers are also develop-
ing techniques to challenge these forensic techniques [141]. The art and sci-
ence of working against forensic techniques is referred to as anti-forensics or
counter-forensics [141]. Some forensic analysis tools were dependent on exploit-
ing the resampling that takes place in digital images. For example, Kirchner and
Bo¨hme [141] showed that by hiding the traces of resampling in digital images,
they could render such forensic analysis tools which depend on resampling detec-
tion in digital images ineffective.
As anti-forensic techniques are working against forensic techniques, the field of
anti-anti-forensics is proposed. This field is aimed at tackling the area of counter-
forensic or anti-forensic techniques [142]. For example, attackers could add a
dithering noise signal in the DCT domain to fool forensic analysis techniques
that depend on JPEG compression, the traces left by this process could still be
exploited by a forensic analyst. Valenzise et al. [143] exploited the distortion in
the DCT domain of anti-forensic dithering to reveal the traces of JPEG compres-
sion anti-forensics. Their method achieved an average accuracy of 93% and 99%
in cases of nearly lossless JPEG compression.
2.4 Summary
This chapter presented a detailed review on the relationships between digital
forensics techniques, biometrics, forensic biometrics, Power laws and network
traffic analysis. We also discussed the relevant data and features to use in the
area of biometrics, keystroke dynamics and network traffic analysis. In addition,
we reviewed different applications of Power laws in literature for image processing,
numeric and string data types. We used the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law for the
first time in biometrics, network traffic analysis and keystroke data. In Chapter 3,
we will investigate the use of Benford’s law for biometric recognition and detection
of malicious tampering of biometric images. The detection and localisation of
tampered raw biometric data will be achieved by using the mode-based first digit
features based on the Benford’s law.
Chapter 3
Benford’s Law Analysis for
Biometric Recognition
The literature review given in Chapter 2 discussed and reviewed several appli-
cations of Power laws (e.g. Benford’s law) in analysing natural images. While
analysis of natural images is important, it is equally important to analyse raw
biometric images to verify its integrity and authenticity. This is very important
because these biometric images are used for biometric recognition purposes. This
chapter investigates the use of Benford’s law for biometric images and the de-
tection of malicious tampering of these images. We then adopt the mode-based
first digit features based on Benford’s law from Li et. al. [3] for the detection and
localisation of tampered raw biometric data. Li et. al.’s technique was adopted
because it detected tampered regions in natural images. To the best of our
knowledge, these features are being used for the first time for raw biometric im-
age tampering and detection. The following sections in this chapter explains the
block-DCT coefficients, JPEG coefficients and how they are used in our proposed
method for investigating raw biometric data for biometric recognition purposes.
3.1 Benford’s Law
Benford’s law has been reported by Fu et. al. [5], Li et. al. [3] and Xu et. al. [144]
to be very effective in detecting tampering of images. Benford’s law of “anoma-
lous digits” was coined by Frank Benford in 1938 [117], which is also described
as the first digit law, considers the frequency of appearance of the MSD, for a
broad range of natural and artificial data [101]. The Benford’s law as described
by Hill [107] can be expressed in the form of a logarithmic distribution, when
considering the probability distribution of the first digit from 1 to 9 for a range
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of natural data. Naturally generated data are supposed to obey this law whereas
tampered or randomly guessed data are supposed to disobey this law [120].
When considering the MSD where 0 is excluded, and the datasets satisfy the
Benford’s law, then the law can be expressed as Equation(3.1) [107].
P (x) = log10(1 +
1
x
) (3.1)
where x is the first digit of the number and P (x) refers to the probability distri-
bution of x.
The first digit probability distribution of Benford’s law is shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: The first digit probability distribution of Benford’s law
An extension of the Benford’s law by Fu et. al. [5] is referred to as generalised Ben-
ford’s law which closely follows a logarithmic law is defined in Equation(3.2) [5].
P (x) = N log10(1 +
1
s+ xq
) (3.2)
where N is a normalization factor which makes P (x) a probability distribution.
The model parameters in this case are represented by s and q which describe
the distributions for different images and different compressions QFs as defined
in [5]. Through experiments, Fu et. al. [5] provided values for N , s and q. They
determined these values using the Matlab toolbox, which returns the Sum of
Squares due to Error (SSE). We adopt the N , s and q values which are shown in
Table 3.1 for our generalised Benford’s law experiment.
36CHAPTER 3. BENFORD’S LAW ANALYSIS FOR BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION
Table 3.1: Model Parameters used for generalised Benford’s law [5]
The standard Benford’s law is used for uncompressed images, whereas the gener-
alised Benford’s law is used for JPEG compressed images. Through experiments,
Fu et. al. [5] showed that, given an unknown test image, it should first be re-
compressed with a QF=100. If the first digit distribution of the JPEG coefficients
of the test image follows the generalised Benford’s law, it has not been previously
compressed. But if it has been previously compressed, it should deviate from the
generalised Benford’s law with a secondary QF=100. To estimate the QF of an
unknown test image, it should first be re-compressed with different QFs starting
from 100 to 50 in a step of 5 for example. The QF with the least distribution
artifact achieved from a comparison between the first digit distribution for the
re-compressed image and the generalised Benford’s law is chosen as the QF of
the test image [5].
There have been several developments concerning the Benford’s law in image
forensics [3] [5] [99] [100] [101] [103]. Jolion [99] applied this law to image pro-
cessing and found that it worked well on the magnitude of the gradient of an
image. He also showed that it applied to the laplacian decomposition of images
as well. Acebo and Sbert [100] also applied the Benford’s law to image processing
and showed that when synthetic images were generated using physically realistic
method, they followed this law. However, when they were generated with dif-
ferent methods, they did not follow this law. Gonzalez et. al. [101] proved that
images when transformed to DCT followed this law. They also showed that the
generalized Benford’s law could detect hidden data in a natural image [101].
Images in pixel domain did not follow this law because the values fall between
0 (black) to 255 (white). This means we have only 256 values to calculate the
Benford’s law when considering images in the pixel domain. Thus this will not
conform to the Benford’s law because this law works better as the dynamic val-
ues under consideration tends to be large. By transforming the pixel values using
DCT, a single block matrix has 64 DCT coefficients, which when combined to-
gether in a whole image, produces dynamic values large enough to follow the
Benford’s law. Fu et. al. [5] used this law on DCT coefficients to detect unknown
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JPEG compression. They used 1,338 images from Uncompressed Image Database
(UCID). They also repeated the same experiment on 198 images from Harrison
datasets. Qadir et. al. [103] analysed the DWT coefficients using Benford’s law
and audited the processing history applied to JPEG2000 images where they ob-
served a sharp peak at the digit five for some images when analysing the Benford’s
law curve. They also proposed the use of the law to identify unbalanced lighting
or glare effect in an image with the help of DWT [103]. Li et. al. [3] used the
statistical features of the first digits of individual alternate current and SVM to
detect and locate the tampered region of natural images.
3.2 Block-DCT & JPEG Coefficients
As shown in Figure 3.2, to achieve the first digit probability distribution based
on the DCT, the partitioning of an original uncompressed raw biometric image
into a non-overlapped 8 x 8 pixel blocks is first performed. The DCT is used to
transform a signal or image from the spatial domain to the frequency domain.
However, it is noted that the direct conversion of a 2D spatial function f(x, y)
into the 2D spectrum F (u, v) of spatial frequencies and vice-versa does not lose
any information from the signal or image [145]. When considering images, the
2D DCT is used because of the 2D signals of images. Basically, JPEG image
compression is block-DCT based and consists of 8 x 8 Block-DCT, Quantization,
and Entropy Coding. A 2D DCT is applied to each block in order to convert it
to a frequency space. This transforms the pixel values into 64 frequency values.
The value at the upper-left corner is referred to as the DC coefficient and the
other 63 values are referred to as the AC coefficients. The 63 AC coefficients are
usually organised in a zig-zag order. Ordering the AC coefficients in a zig-zag
manner produces a gradual change across the block as compared to the sharp
change that occurs when ordering is carried out from pixel to pixel. Ordering
pixels that greatly vary from their neighbours will result to just dots that are
meaningless.
In this chapter, only the AC coefficients are used. Before quantization, the 8
x 8 block-DCT coefficients are referred to as block-DCT coefficients. The quan-
tization table is therefore applied to each block of the DCT coefficients [145].
After this process, the JPEG coefficients are produced. For our experiments,
we are interested in analysing the probability distribution of the first digits of
the block-DCT coefficients of biometric coloured face images and biometric gray
level fingerprint images to see whether they follow the standard Benford’s law or
not. We will then analyse the probability distribution of first digits of the JPEG
coefficients to determine whether they also follow the generalized Benford’s law
or not.
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Figure 3.2: Schematic diagram for our proposed application of Benford’s law to raw
biometric data for processing, tamper detection and localisation
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3.2.1 Quantization & Quality Factor
As earlier stated, the JPEG coefficients are achieved after quantization. There
exists a tradeoff between the visual quality of an image and the QF on a image.
For example, a QF=100 produces the best quality for an image with the smallest
quantization step. Furthermore, this QF produces the least compression. On the
contrary, a QF=1 produces an opposite effect on an image. A standard quanti-
zation table (Q50) is used for the JPEG. The Q50 matrix is given by the matrix:
Q50 =

16 11 10 16 24 40 51 61
12 12 14 19 26 58 60 55
14 13 16 24 40 57 69 56
14 17 22 29 51 87 80 62
18 22 37 56 68 109 103 77
24 35 55 64 81 104 113 92
49 64 78 87 103 121 120 101
72 92 95 98 112 100 103 99

However, if a different QF and compression is needed, a scaled matrix (S) of
Q50 is used. This is calculated using Equation 3.3. The dynamically generated
quantization table (Qd) is achieved using Equation 3.4:
S =
{
5000/QF QF<50
200− 2QF QF>50 (3.3)
Qd =
(Qs ∗ S + 50)
100
(3.4)
The quantization steps in a double JPEG compression is supposed to be different
with the quantization steps in a primary JPEG compression [111]. This property
works properly when the secondary quantization step is not an integer multiple
of the primary quantization step. This is helpful in distinguishing double JPEG
compression from single JPEG compression. This is because, the JPEG coeffi-
cients of double JPEG compressed images are different from those of single JPEG
compressed images. By double JPEG compression, we mean an image is consec-
utively compressed with a primary quality factor (QF1) and a secondary quality
factor (QF2). It is noted that, when quantization occurs, a smaller dataset is
achieved because most of the higher frequency digits goes to 0 and are discarded.
However, the lower frequency digits which are more sensitive to the eye are not
discarded [111]. This means the quantization matrix has an effect on the num-
ber of zeros produced. For example, a quantization matrix of Q10 produces more
zeros as compared to a quantization matrix of Q100 which produces few zeros.
Even though, quantization affects the higher frequency digits, the 0s are dis-
carded and as such to test whether a dataset follow Benford’s law or not, Fu et.
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al. [5] suggested the use of all 63 AC coefficients which are ordered in a zig-zag
scan. However, for tamper detection, there is an exception to the use of all 63
AC coefficients which will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4.
In this chapter, we use the block-DCT coefficients and JPEG coefficients to verify
the authenticity of raw biometric images. Figure 3.2 shows the schematic dia-
gram of our proposed method that applies Benford’s law to raw biometric data
for processing, tamper detection and localisation.
3.3 Application to Biometric Images
The goals of the first set of experiments are to investigate the block-DCT and
JPEG coefficients for both face and fingerprint images to determine whether they
follow the standard Benford’s law and generalized Benford’s law. The second set
of experiments is to evaluate the overall performance of our method.
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
Images used in these experiments are from two biometric databases. For the
face modality, the CASIA-FACEV5 is used which consists of 2500 coloured im-
ages of 500 subjects [146]. The face images are 16 bit colour BMP files with
image resolution of 640 x 480. We use all the face images from CASIA-FACEV5
in this experiment. For the fingerprint modality, we use the FVC2000 which
has four different fingerprint databases (DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4) [147]. DB1,
DB2, DB3 and DB4 have 80 gray scale fingerprint images in (tiff format) each.
DB1 fingerprint images are captured by a low-cost optical sensor “Secure Desk-
top Scanner”. While DB2 fingerprint images are captured by a low-cost optical
capacitive sensor “TouchChip”. DB3 fingerprint images are from optical sensor
“DF-90”. DB4 fingerprint images are synthetically generated fingerprints. We
use these databases to test whether they follow the Benford’s law. However, for
the fact that these fingerprints (DB1, DB2, DB3) are captured using different
sensors and DB4 is synthetically generated, we treat them as separate fingerprint
databases. The luminance component of the face images is first extracted and
the first digit of the block-DCT coefficients is then performed on the face images.
To test for conformity of a particular data set to the Benford’s law, one of the
most common criteria used is the chi-square goodness-of-fit statistics test [3] [5]
[100] [103] [111]. The Chi-square divergence (χ2) is expressed in Equation(3.5).
χ2 =
9∑
x=1
(P
′
x − Px)2
Px
(3.5)
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where P
′
x is the actual first digit probability and Px is the Benford’s law as given
in Equation(3.1). For the standard Benford’s law, the averaged χ2 is calculated
between the actual first digit distribution and the standard Benford’s law for each
63 AC coefficients. Whereas, for the generalised Benford’s law, the averaged χ2
is calculated between the actual first digit distribution of the JPEG coefficients
and the generalised Benford’s law for each 63 AC coefficients. In each case, the
χ2 are averaged over all the biometric images in a particular biometric database.
We observe that the probability distributions of the first digits of the block-DCT
coefficients for uncompressed face images, DB1 fingerprints, DB2 fingerprints,
DB3 fingerprints and DB4 fingerprints images closely follow the standard Ben-
fords law. Average divergence values of 0.00047, 0.000074, 0.00024, 0.000029 and
0.000024 are obtained for the face images, DB1 fingerprints, DB2 fingerprints,
DB3 fingerprints and DB4 fingerprints images, respectively. As can be seen from
these average divergence values, the smaller the divergence the better the fitting.
This clearly shows that uncompressed biometric data are closely followed by the
standard Benford’s law as shown in Figure 3.3.
Furthermore, we calculate the average divergence values for the uncompressed
face images, DB1 fingerprints, DB2 fingerprints, DB3 fingerprints and DB4 fin-
gerprints images for different QF’s from 90 to 50 in step of -10 as shown in Table
3.2.
From Table 3.2, we observe that as the QF reduces, the divergence value in-
creases, which implies less fitting to the Benford’s law. This is due to the fact
that lower QF’s indicating higher compression, which degrades the quality of an
image under consideration. We also observe that the JPEG coefficients of the
biometric face images, DB1 fingerprints, DB2 fingerprints, DB3 fingerprints and
DB4 fingerprints images closely followed the generalized Benford’s law based on
a Quality Factor (QF) of 100, N=1.456, q=1.47, and s=0.0372 as shown in Fig-
ure 3.4. We used QF=100 because this QF represent the original quality image,
when compared with other QF’s.
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Figure 3.3: Block-DCT coefficients closely follow Benford’s law for: (a) face images, (b)
DB1 fingerprint images, (c) DB2 fingerprint images, (d) DB3 fingerprint images, (e) DB4
fingerprint images.
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Quality
Factor
Divergence
(face im-
ages)
Divergence
(DB1)
Divergence
(DB2)
Divergence
(DB3)
Divergence
(DB4)
90 0.04512 0.03215 0.02455 0.024512 0.02092
80 0.05310 0.03529 0.03745 0.02666 0.01991
70 0.05542 0.036016 0.04040 0.03041 0.02053
60 0.05504 0.03566 0.04256 0.03601 0.022176
50 0.05772 0.03858 0.04340 0.04033 0.02330
Table 3.2: Divergence values for uncompressed biometric face images, DB1 fingerprints,
DB2 fingerprints, DB3 fingerprints and DB4 fingerprints images under different QF’s.
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Figure 3.4: JPEG coefficients closely follow generalised Benford’s law at QF=100 for: (a)
face images, (b) DB1 fingerprint images, (c) DB2 fingerprint images, (d) DB3 fingerprint
images, (e) DB4 fingerprint images.
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The divergence formula in Equation(3.5) is used, but this time the P
′
x is the
actual first digit probability of the JPEG coefficients of the biometric face or
fingerprint images and Px is the logarithmic law (generalized Benford’s law) [5].
We obtained average divergence values of 0.00634, 0.00145, 0.00702, 0.00760 and
0.00526 considering a QF=100 for the face images, DB1 fingerprints, DB2 finger-
prints, DB3 fingerprints and DB4 fingerprints images, respectively. These values
indicate a good fit based on the model parameters shown in Table 3.1. We also
show in Table 3.3 using QFs from 90 to 50 in step -10 that the JPEG coefficients
of the biometric face images, DB1 fingerprints, DB2 fingerprints, DB3 finger-
prints and DB4 fingerprints images follow the generalized Benford’s law by using
the divergence formula in Equation(3.5). These were also found to give a good
fitting as shown in Table 3.3 based on using the corresponding model parameters
in Table 3.1.
Quality
Factor
Divergence
(face im-
ages)
Divergence
(DB1)
Divergence
(DB2)
Divergence
(DB3)
Divergence
(DB4)
90 0.03424 0.04423 0.00528 0.00903 0.00417
80 0.05310 0.04328 0.02225 0.01046 0.00237
70 0.06902 0.04164 0.02743 0.00952 0.00211
60 0.01794 0.00801 0.02946 0.00325 0.00284
50 0.00823 0.00355 0.03205 0.00310 0.00621
Table 3.3: Divergence values for JPEG coefficients of face images, DB1 fingerprints, DB2
fingerprints, DB3 fingerprints and DB4 fingerprints under different QF’s.
3.3.2 Performance Evaluation of Detecting Single Compression and
Double Compression
When an uncompressed image is compressed for the first time, it is considered
an original single JPEG compressed image. When an original single JPEG com-
pressed image is compressed for the second time, it is considered a double JPEG
compressed image [111]. This property is important because when an original
JPEG image is tampered with in a localised area and re-saved in a JPEG format,
the compression history of the entire image is not the same anymore. The un-
tampered region undergoes a double compression whereas, the tampered region
undergoes a single compression [3]. Detecting double compression is also very
useful for image processing history recovery [148] [149].
In order to measure the performance of how single compression and double com-
pression of biometric images are detected, we first estimate the probability density
function [150] from the face and fingerprint images. The kernel density estima-
tion technique is used to estimate the probability density function because it
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is smooth and its performance is not dependent on the start or end of bins as
compared to density estimation based on histograms [151]. This is performed
for both the single compression and double compression, bearing in mind that
QF=100 indicate an image with best quality. In view of this, a single compression
of 100 and double compression of QF1=100 and QF2=100 are both considered
images with the best quality. A single compression of QF1=50 to 100 in step
10 is performed for all the datasets, and the probability density function of the
divergence results are shown in Figures 3.5 (a) and (b), respectively.
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Figure 3.5: The pdf of the divergence of: (a) single compressed face images of QF=100
versus the pdf of other QFs from 90 to 50 in step -10; (b) single compressed DB1 finger-
print images of QF=100 versus the pdf of other QFs from 90 to 50 in step -10.
Furthermore, a double compression of QF1=55, 65, 75, 85, 100 and QF2=70, 80,
90, 95, 100 is also performed on all the datasets and the probability density func-
tion of the divergence results are shown in Figures 3.6 (a) and (b), respectively.
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Figure 3.6: The pdf of the divergence of: (a) double compressed face images of QF1=100,
QF2=100 versus other QFs including QF1=55, 65, 75, 85 and QF2=70, 80, 90, 95; (b)
double compressed DB1 fingerprint images of QF1=100, QF2=100 versus other QFs
including QF1=55, 65, 75, 85 and QF2=70, 80, 90, 95.
To determine how images with single compression QF=100 compared with the
rest of the compression are detected, we use the area under curve (AUC) of the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. It also analyses how images with
double compression QF1=100, QF2=100 are detected compared with the other
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images with different QF’s. A ROC curve is a plot of True Positive Rate (TPR)
versus False Positive Rate (FPR) at different thresholds. Using the compressed
images as the reference, which is the target class to be detected, we achieved the
ROC curves shown in Figure 3.7 (a),(b),(c), and (d). From Figures 3.7 (a),(b),(c),
and (d), we observe that an AUC of 0.916005 is achieved when detecting single
compression of face images. When detecting single compression of DB1 finger-
print images, an AUC of 0.962549 is achieved. Also, a 0.853958 AUC is achieved
when detecting double compression of face images. Again, an AUC of 0.859375 is
achieved when detecting double compressed DB1 fingerprint images. We observe
almost similar AUC values for the double compression of biometric images. This
could be as a result of the quantization effect of QF=100 which is experienced
in each of the double JPEG compression performed. This is possible because for
each QF1, there exists at least a single corresponding QF2=100.
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Figure 3.7: ROC curve for: (a) single compressed face images; (b) single compressed
DB1 fingerprint images; (c) double compressed face images; (d) double compressed DB1
fingerprint images
We further investigate this method on DB2, DB3 and DB4 of the fingerprint im-
ages and the ROC curve for double compressed DB2 fingerprint images is shown
in Figures 3.8. Furthermore, we show the AUC values for single compressed DB2,
DB3 and DB4 of the fingerprint images in Table 3.4 and double compressed DB2,
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DB3 and DB4 of the fingerprint images in Table 3.5. The single compressed ROC
curves for the fingerprint images are not shown because, we observe a 1.000000
AUC value (meaning the detection accuracy of 100% is achieved). Again, be-
cause the double compressed DB2, DB3 and DB4 fingerprint images all achieved
an AUC value of 0.859375, we show only a single ROC curve result for double
compressed DB2 fingerprint database.
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Figure 3.8: ROC curve for double compressed DB2 fingerprint images
Fingerprint Data AUC
Single compressed DB2 fingerprint images 1.000000
Single compressed DB3 fingerprint images 1.000000
Single compressed DB4 fingerprint images 1.000000
Table 3.4: AUC for single compressed fingerprints at QF=100 versus other QFs from 90
to 50 in step -10
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Fingerprint Data AUC
Double compressed DB2 fingerprint images 0.859375
Double compressed DB3 fingerprint images 0.859375
Double compressed DB4 fingerprint images 0.859375
Table 3.5: AUC for double compressed fingerprints at QF1=100, QF2=100 versus other
QFs including QF1=55, 65, 75, 85 and QF2=70, 80, 90, 95
3.4 Tampered Detection of Biometric Modalities
In Section 3.3.1 we showed that biometric images followed the Benford’s law. In
this section, the approach is extended for tamper detection by incorporating a
two class SVM as proposed in [3] to detect tampering of biometric face images
and fingerprint images. This method is chosen because it has been effective in
detecting tampering of natural images.
There are other methods that can be used to differentiate authentic images from
tampered ones (e.g. spliced images). One of the approaches found in literature,
is by using the Fourier transform at the block-level, based on the phase infor-
mation [152] [153]. However, this approach was not used in our research based
on some of its shortcomings. First, as noted by Uzun et. al. [153], FFT used
for applications such as signal and image processing requires high computational
power. Furthermore, using the phase information of an image for spliced signal
detection degrades in performance when post-processing on the spliced signal is
performed [152]. Bouridane [10], pointed out that even though, training process
could be computationally intensive, if the process is done efficiently, the matching
process is very fast and the results are highly accurate. Therefore, we use the
JPEG coefficients and SVM for tamper detection and localization of tampered
biometric images which is able to overcome these shortcomings. We investigate
whether portions of tampered raw JPEG biometric images can be detected and
localised. In order to investigate tampering of biometric face images and finger-
print images in databases with the help of Benford’s law features, face images
from CASIA-FACEV5 and fingerprint images from FVC2000 are digitally tam-
pered using Photoshop software.
Human eyes are more sensitive for low-frequency signal as compared to high-
frequency signal [3]. When tampering occurs in a region of an image, the tam-
pered region has an invisible clue or statistical artifact that is left behind. Li
et. al. [3] showed that for tamper detection, which may involve a small region,
using only 20 AC coefficients should be sufficient to detect the smallest tampered
region. However, if all the 63 AC coefficients are considered for tamper detection,
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the smaller tampered regions may be missed. Therefore, for tamper detection,
only the first 20 AC coefficients ordered in a zig-zag scan are used as proposed
in [3]. The next section describes our experimental setup with a focus on face
and fingerprint images tamper detection.
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
Our assumption in this experiment is that double compressed images have been
tampered with, whereas single compressed images have not been tampered with.
In a practical scenario, tampering of an image may occur in a certain region of an
image and the remaining region may be un-tampered. Hence, this experimental
setup is based on the hypothesis that a tampered region of an image undergoes a
single JPEG compression and an un-tampered region undergoes a double JPEG
compression. It is reported that double compressed natural images at different
QF’s violate a logarithmic pattern whereas single compressed natural images fol-
lows a logarithmic pattern [111]. This property is used when detecting tampering
in natural images. The technique works under the hypothesis that a tampered
region has undergone a single JPEG compression and an un-tampered region has
undergone a double JPEG compression [3]. An example of this property can be
seen in Figure 3.9 where the first digits distribution of single compressed finger-
prints at QF = 80 follows the logarithmic law whereas the double compressed
fingerprints at QF1= 50 and QF2= 80 violates the logarithmic law.
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Figure 3.9: First digits distribution of single compressed fingerprints at QF1 = 80
follows the logarithmic law and double compressed fingerprints at QF1= 50 and QF2=
80 violates the logarithmic law.
To obtain tampering of face images and fingerprint images, the raw uncompressed
face images and fingerprint images are JPEG compressed for the first time with
a QF= 100 which produces the best quality of images. The same set of JPEG
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compressed face images are digitally tampered, focusing on the face recognition
features such as the eyes, nose, or entire face images. This is carried out by
copying a region from a different face image and pasting on a different face image.
After the copy and paste operation, the composite face image is saved in JPEG
format. For the fingerprint images, they are digitally tampered by copying the
center part of a different fingerprint and pasting on the center part of another
fingerprint. At the end of the manipulation, a composite JPEG fingerprint image
is produced. Some little modifications are carried out on both the face images
and fingerprint images to produce realistic biometric images. The sample face
image manipulation used in our experiments are shown in Figure 3.10
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3.10: Face image of: (a) JPEG girl at QF=100, (b) JPEG boy at QF=100, (c)
Eyes and nose of (a) replaced with eyes and nose from (b).
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The sample fingerprint image manipulation used in our experiments are shown
in Figure 3.11
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3.11: Fingerprint image: (a) JPEG compressed at QF=80, (b) JPEG compressed
at QF=50, (c) center portion of (b) replaced with center portion from (a).
To further explain how the detection is carried out on digitally tampered face
images and fingerprint images, the next section explains in detail the most based
first digit features which are obtained using the Benford’s law.
3.4.2 Mode Based First Digit Features
The mode-based first digit features (MBFDF) have been used to detect tam-
pered regions in natural images [3]. However, it has not been performed on raw
biometric data. Hence, we conduct experiments on tampered face images and
fingerprint images which are biometric modalities. We randomly select 1000 nat-
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ural images for single JPEG compression (which are usually uncompressed images
from UCID [154]) and double JPEG compression. Single JPEG compression is
carried out using QF1= 70 to 90 in a step of 10 and double JPEG compression
using QF1= 55 to 75 in a step of 10 and QF2= 70 to 90 in a step of 10. The
first digits’ probability distributions of the top 20 AC coefficients for the single
JPEG compressed data and double JPEG compressed data are then performed.
The MBFDF features are used to train a two-class SVM. A zero cross-validation
is performed on the training dataset using the radial basis function (RBF) as
the kernel type. The RBF kernel is chosen because it non-linearly maps the
JPEG coefficients achieved from single compression and double compression into
a higher dimensional space. In this case, it handles the non-linear relationship
between the class labels and the JPEG coefficients.
For our experiment, SVM degree = 3, gamma (γ) = 0, classification proba-
bility = 0 and a scaling parameter (C)=1 are used. Tampered face images and
fingerprint images for testing are divided into continuous non-overlapping 8 × 8
pixel blocks. For each block of the biometric face image and fingerprint image,
a sub-image of size (2n + 1) × (2n + 1) blocks is taken, where n=0, 1, 2. The
first digits probability distributions of JPEG coefficients of the first 20 AC co-
efficients for each of the sub-image are used as a feature vector with dimension
of 20 × 9 to determine whether the sub-image has been manipulated with the
help of SVM. In this experiment, n is set to 2 in order to detect the tampered
regions on the tampered face images and fingerprint images. Figure 3.12 shows
the schematic diagram of our proposed method for tamper detection and local-
isation of biometric modalities. To clearly explain how the tampered blocks on
the face images and fingerprints images are determined, the next section explains
this process identifying the number of blocks that are tampered for each face
image and fingerprint image used in our experiment.
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Figure 3.12: Schematic diagram for our proposed tamper detection and localisation [3]
3.5 Estimation of Block-level tampering for Biometric Im-
ages
When a biometric face image or fingerprint image is tampered, some blocks are
tampered, while other blocks are not. We therefore detect the number of tam-
pered blocks in order to illustrate exactly where a biometric sample is tampered,
taking into consideration a corresponding un-tampered biometric sample.
The main steps to estimate block-level tampering are as follows:
1. Load an un-tampered and a corresponding tampered biometric image which
are both in JPEG format.
2. Pad the matrices using Algorithm 1, to avoid un-equal blocks in order to
achieve rows and columns that are divisible by 8.
3. Divide the individual biometric face images or fingerprint images into non-
overlapping 8× 8 blocks.
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4. To avoid cropping effects at the edges of the biometric face images or finger-
print images, mask each of the biometric face images or fingerprint images at
edges using Algorithm 2.
5. With the help of thresholding on the tampered biometric image, get the num-
ber of tampered and un-tampered regions.
6. Feed the tampered and un-tampered regions into the Weighted Error Rate
(WER) [155] software to get the AUC value, and deduce the detection accuracy.
Algorithm 1 Padding
Input: A non-empty matrix of size r × c
Output: Matrix of size m× n | mod(m, 8) = 0 & mod(n, 8) = 0
1: Append 8−mod(r, 8) rows containing zeros to the input matrix.
∴ size of the matrix is now m× c | mod(m, 8) = 0
2: Append 8−mod(c, 8) columns containing zeros to the matrix obtained.
∴ size of the matrix is m× n | mod(m, 8) = 0 & mod(n, 8) = 0
Algorithm 2 Masking
Input: A non-empty matrix of size r × c
Output: Matrix of size r × c | edges of the matrix are zeros.
a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,c
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,c
...
...
. . .
...
ar,1 ar,2 · · · ar,c
 ⇒

0 0 a1,3 · · · a1,c−2 0 0
0 a2,2 · · · · · · · · · a2,c−1 0
a3,1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · a3,c
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
ar−2,1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ar−3,c
0 ar−1,2 · · · · · · · · · ar−1,c−1 0
0 0 ar3 · · · ar,c−2 0 0

b =

i=1 & j=1, j=2, j=c-1, j=c
i=2 & j=1, j=c
i=r-1 & j=1, j=c
i=r & j=1, j=2, j=c-1, j=c

aij =
{
0 if b
aij if otherwise
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Applying the above described algorithm specifically to our biometric images used
in this experiments, the number of tampered blocks, AUC, and detection accuracy
are given in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7.
Face Image Number of
Tampered
Blocks
Image size
(in pixels)
AUC Detection
Accuracy
Figure 3.13
(b)
317 135 X 153 0.9695 96.95 %
Figure 3.13
(d)
396 151 X 175 0.9741 97.41%
Table 3.6: Tampered Blocks and the Detection Accuracy of Tampered Face images.
The tampered face detection results can be seen in Figure 3.13 (b & d), where
the tampered regions are identified as white regions and the un-tampered regions
are identified as black regions. The AUCs are shown in Table 3.6 and will be
discussed in Section 3.5.1.
We further show the number of tampered fingerprints blocks with the AUC and
detection accuracy in Table 3.7. The tampered regions of the fingerprint images
are identified as white regions and the untampered regions are identified as black
regions as shown in Figure 3.14. The AUCs will be discussed in Section 3.5.1.
Fingerprint
Image
Number of
Tampered
Blocks
Image size
(in pixels)
AUC Detection
Accuracy
Figure 3.14(a) 845 300 X 300 0.9544 95.44%
Figure 3.14 (b) 750 300 X 300 0.9355 93.55%
Figure 3.14 (c) 1372 300 X 300 0.9640 96.40%
Figure 3.14 (d) 847 300 X 300 0.9480 94.80%
Figure 3.14 (e) 749 300 X 300 0.9270 92.70%
Figure 3.14 (f) 1375 300 X 300 0.9610 96.10%
Table 3.7: Tampered Blocks and the Detection Accuracy of Tampered Fingerprint im-
ages.
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(a)  (b)  
(c)  (d)  
Figure 3.13: Face image: (a) tampered; (b) detected; (c) tampered; (d) detected.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Figure 3.14: Detection of: (a) uncompressed fingerprint (.tif) inserted into a compressed
fingerprint (QF=50) and the composite fingerprint saved at a QF=70; (b) uncompressed
fingerprint (.tif) inserted into a compressed fingerprint (QF=60) and the composite fin-
gerprint saved at a QF=75; (c) compressed fingerprint (QF=80) inserted into a com-
pressed fingerprint (QF=50) and the composite fingerprint saved at a QF=70; (d) com-
pressed fingerprint (QF=50) inserted into a compressed fingerprint (QF=70) and the
composite fingerprint saved at a QF=70; (e) compressed fingerprint (QF=60) inserted
into a compressed fingerprint (QF=75) and the composite fingerprint saved at a QF=75;
(f) uncompressed fingerprint (.tif) inserted into a compressed fingerprint (QF=80) and
the composite fingerprint saved at a QF=70. (g-h) un-tampered JPEG fingerprints com-
pressed at QF=70 and QF=100 respectively. Each square represents a 5× 5 block.
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3.5.1 Results and Discussion
The probability distributions of the first digits of the block-DCT coefficients of
uncompressed biometric face and fingerprint images closely follow the standard
Benford’s law. The JPEG coefficients of the same data sets also closely follow
the generalized Benford’s law considering QFs from 50 to 100 in step 10, with
corresponding values of N, s and q as shown in Table 3.1.
For AUC values shown in Figure 3.7, our proposed method correctly detected
single compressed face images, single compressed DB1 fingerprint images, double
compressed face images and double compressed DB1 fingerprint images with accu-
racies of 0.9160, 0.9625, 0.8540 and 0.8594 respectively. For AUC values shown in
Tables 3.4 and 3.5, detection accuracies of 1.0000, 0.8594, 1.0000, 0.8594,1.0000
and 0.8594 were achieved for single compressed DB2 fingerprint, double com-
pressed DB2 fingerprint, single compressed DB3 fingerprint, double compressed
DB3 fingerprint, single compressed DB4 fingerprint and double compressed DB4
fingerprint images, respectively.
For biometric data tampering detection, high detection accuracies for both tam-
pered face images and fingerprint images were achieved and shown in Table 3.6
and 3.7. Experimental results achieved from 2 images of CASIA-FACEV5 and 6
images of FVC2000 (DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4) suggest that tampered biometric face
images and fingerprint images can be detected with the Benford’s law features
and SVM classifier.
3.5.2 Summary
In this chapter, we showed that the raw un-tampered biometric images followed
the Benford’s law and tampered images were detected and localised using Ben-
ford’s law features and SVM. The highest detection and localisation accuracies
for the biometric face images and fingerprint images were achieved at 97.41% and
96.40%, respectively. In Chapter 4, we will investigate how Power law (Benford’s
law) can be applied to physical biometrics traits.
Chapter 4
Power Laws for Physical
Biometrics
4.1 Overview
In Chapter 3, we showed that biometric images followed the Benford’s law and
that the Benford’s law features could be used with SVM to detect and localise
tampering in raw JPEG biometric images. In this chapter, we show how close
or far different types of biometric fingerprint images are from the Benford’s law
using the divergence metrics. The new contribution in this chapter is the proposed
use of Power laws (Benford’s law) for physical biometrics (fingerprint images).
The following sections give an introduction of biometric modalities and their
uses, followed by discussions on experiments using Benford’s law divergence for
classification and source identification of fingerprint images.
4.2 Introduction to Biometric Modalities
There exists different types of physical biometric modalities such as fingerprint
images, vein wrist images, face images and iris images. Again, considering only
fingerprint images, there are different types of fingerprints such as contact-less
acquired latent fingerprints, optically acquired fingerprints and synthetic gener-
ated fingerprints. These fingerprints could be intentionally or accidentally used
for a different purpose which could pose a security threat. Again, there exists a
possibility of fingerprint forgery at crime scenes. By fingerprint forgery at crime
scene we mean transferring latent fingerprint to other objects [156].
Approaches have been developed to tackle fingerprint forgeries. Iorliam et al. [105]
used the Benford’s law divergence metric to separate optically acquired finger-
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prints, synthetically generated fingerprints and contact-less acquired fingerprints.
The purpose of this study was to protect against insider attackers and against
hackers that may have illegal access to such biometric data. Hildebrandt and
Dittmann [157] used the differences between Benford’s law and the distribution
of the most significant digit of the intensity and topography data to detect printed
fingerprints. Their experiments on 3000 printed and 3000 latent print samples
achieved a detection performance of up to 98.85% using WEKA’s Bagging classi-
fier in a 10-fold stratified cross-validation. Motivated by approaches in [105] and
[157], we focus and investigate different fingerprint data using Benford’s law diver-
gence metrics in this chapter. The Benford’s law divergence values are then used
for classification. Therefore an intra-class classification of fingerprint images us-
ing Benford’s law divergence is performed. By intra-class classification, we mean
separability of biometric images that are closely related (e.g. contact-less ac-
quired latent fingerprints, optically acquired fingerprints and synthetic generated
fingerprints).
4.3 Experimental Set-up
The goal of the first experiment is to separately investigate JPEG coefficients
of artificially printed contact-less acquired latent fingerprint images to determine
whether they follow the generalised Benford’s law. The second set of the experi-
ment is to use the divergence metrics to show how the data samples used for this
experiments depart from the generalised Benford’s law.
Lastly, the Benford’s law divergence values acquired from intra-class fingerprint
images (i.e. from optical sensor acquired fingerprints images, artificially printed
contact-less acquired latent fingerprint images and synthetic generated finger-
prints) are used for separability purposes. There is a real need to separate fin-
gerprint images as discussed in the next section.
4.3.1 Separation of different types of biometric images
Generally, biometrics is used either for verification (1-to-1 matching) where we
seek to answer the question “Is this person who they say they are?” or for identi-
fication (1-to-many (n) matching) where we seek to answer the question “Who is
this person?” or “Who generated this biometric?” [9]. To achieve identification
or verification, biometric modalities are used. Fingerprints, which is one of the
biometric modalities, have been used for identification purposes for over a cen-
tury [158].
Fingerprints have different uses. For example, fingerprints captured using optical
sensors are used for identification or verification. Whereas synthetic generated
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fingerprints are used for testing fingerprint recognition algorithms. This requires
a large database and collecting real fingerprints for such a large database is very
expensive, labour intensive and problematic [159]. According to Chen et al. [160],
synthetic fingerprints pose a threat to automatic fingerprint identification sys-
tems (AFIs). This is because synthetic fingerprints have been used over the years
to successfully evaluate fingerprint matching algorithms [160]. Therefore, syn-
thetic fingerprints can deceive AFIs. Hence, the identification and classification
of synthetic fingerprints from real fingerprints is of great importance. This pro-
cess could be achieved by performing an intra-class classification of fingerprint
images to avoid cases of intentional (attack) or unintentional mixture of finger-
print images of different types in fingerprint databases. The contact-less acquired
latent fingerprints are generated for evaluation and research purposes with the
aim of avoiding privacy implications [161]. The study of different characteris-
tics of these fingerprint images is of importance both for biometrics and forensic
purposes. This process could assist in the source identification of captured fin-
gerprint images. This can be achieved by identifying the source hardware that
captured the fingerprint image [162]. This is necessary in cases where the “chain
of custody” involving a fingerprint image has to be properly verified [162].
4.3.2 Data Sets
The FVC2000 data sets (DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4) [147] used in this experiment
are described in Section 3.3.1. An additional fingerprint dataset used in this
experiment contains 48 artificially printed contact-less acquired latent fingerprint
images. These are gray-scale images with 32 bit colour depth [161].
4.3.3 Results for generalised Benford’s law
In this section, the first digit distributions of JPEG coefficients for artificially
printed contact-less acquired latent fingerprint images are investigated to test
their conformity to the generalised Benford’s law. We first JPEG compress all
these fingerprint images with a QF=100. In order to achieve the first digits of the
JPEG coefficients for these fingerprints, the mean distribution of the first digits of
the JPEG coefficients based on 48 artificially printed contact-less acquired latent
fingerprint images is performed. We observe that the JPEG coefficients of the
artificially printed contact-less acquired latent fingerprint images do not closely
follow the generalized Benford’s law based on a QF=100, N=1.456, q=1.47 and
s=0.0372 as shown in Figures 4.1. An average chi-square divergence value of
0.01506 is obtained for QF=100 for the artificially printed contact-less acquired
latent fingerprint images.
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Figure 4.1: JPEG coefficients of artificially printed contact-less acquired latent finger-
prints does not closely follow the generalized Benford’s law at QF=100
In the next section, we show that fingerprint images can be classified using diver-
gence values. The classification is based on intra-class classification of fingerprint
modality.
4.3.4 Divergence metric and separability of biometric databases
We investigate DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 from the FVC2000 database as well
as the artificially printed contact-less acquired latent fingerprint images. These
databases are JPEG compressed at QF of 50 to 100 in a step of 10 to achieve
the JPEG coefficients. The divergence metric is used to show how close or far
a particular data set is, either with the standard or generalised Benford’s law.
In all cases, a smaller divergence gives a better fitting. In our experiments, the
fingerprint databases are single compressed at a QF of 50 to 100 in a step of
10. The divergence obtained is based on the first digit probability distribution of
JPEG coefficients of the 63 AC coefficients ordered in a zig-zag scan. Therefore,
a feature vector of 63 x 9 dimension is obtained for each 8 x 8 block. The 9-
dimensional features are probabilities of the nine first digits of each 8 x 8 block.
As such, the divergence is calculated as an average on all the data sets as can be
seen in Figure 4.2. The box plots in Figure 4.2 show that DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4
and contact-less acquired latent fingerprints divergence at different QF’s from
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50 to 100 in a step of 10 are not the same. In Figure 4.2, we observe that the
different fingerprint images behave differently when anlaysed using the Benford’s
law divergence metrics.
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Figure 4.2: Box plot of the divergence for single compressed DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4 and
contact-less acquired latent fingerprints for a QF= 50 to 100 in step of 10
In the next section, we measure the performance of how divergence values classi-
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fied different types of fingerprint images with accuracy.
4.4 Performance Evaluation for the Classification of Fin-
gerprint Images Using Benford’s law divergence
As mentioned earlier, the Benford’s law divergence values for different fingerprint
images were found to be different. Hence, we use the AUC values achieved from
the ROC curve to show the classification accuracy, as this may assist in the
classification and source identification of different fingerprint images.
4.4.1 Intra-Class Separability of Fingerprint Images
In this section, we carry out an intra-class classification of biometric fingerprint
images. These fingerprints are DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4 and contact-less acquired
latent fingerprints. A QF=100 produces the best quality of an image and as such
does not have a significant effect on the divergence values used for the intra-class
separability of fingerprint images. Therefore, to classify and identify the different
fingerprints with accuracies, we consider QF= 50 to 90 in step of 10. For the
intra-class classification, our dataset consist of a total of 368 x 5 dimension, with
class 1 (DB1 fingerprints images) having 80 x 5 dimension, class 2 (DB2 finger-
prints images) having 80 x 5 dimension, class 3 (DB3 fingerprints images) having
80 x 5 dimension, class 4 (DB4 fingerprints images) having 80 x 5 dimension
and class 5 (contact-less acquired fingerprints) having 48 x 5 dimension. The 5
dimensional features are achieved from QF= 50 to 90 in step of 10.
Using the DB4 (synthetic fingerprint images) as the reference, which is the class
to be detected and classified from the other fingerprint images, we achieved the
ROC curves shown in Figure 4.3. From the ROC curves shown in Figure 4.3, we
observe that DB4 fingerprint images can be classified from DB1, DB2, DB3 and
contact-less acquired fingerprint images with AUC values of 0.835436, 0.924344,
0.763137 and 0.760357, respectively.
4.4.2 Comparative Analysis of Intra-class Classification of Fingerprint
Images
The need for the investigation and classification of intra-class fingerprint images
is motivated from the concept of mixed biometrics [163]. By mixed biometrics,
it means mixing different fingerprints, different faces, or different iris in order
to generate joint identities and also to preserve privacy [163]. Mixed biometrics
also cover mixing two distinct biometric modalities such as fingerprint and iris
to form a joint biometric modality. This means there is a possibility of mixing
closely related fingerprint images (intra-class).
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Figure 4.3: ROC curve for: (a) DB4 fingerprint images vs DB1 fingerprint images; (b)
DB4 fingerprint images vs DB2 fingerprint images; (c) DB4 fingerprint images vs DB3
fingerprint images; (d) DB4 fingerprint images vs contact-less acquired fingerprint images
For comparison, our work is simple and does not involve training as compared to
the state-of-the-art method developed by Hildebrandt and Dittmann [157]. With-
out training our highest classification accuracy is 92.4344%. Even though the
state-of-the-art method [157] highest detection performance accuracy is 98.85%,
it involves training the fingerprint samples which is a shortcoming.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we demonstrated that the JPEG coefficients of artificially printed
contact-less acquired latent fingerprints did not follow the generalised Benford’s
law. Average divergence value of 0.01506 was achieved for the artificially printed
contact-less acquired latent fingerprints. The Benford’s law divergence values
were used for the classification of fingerprint images (DB1 fingerprints, DB2 fin-
gerprints, DB3 fingerprints, DB4 fingerprints and contact-less acquired latent
fingerprints). The highest classification accuracy for the fingerprint images was
92.4344%.
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In the next chapter, we investigate the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law for be-
havioural biometrics (keystroke data).
Chapter 5
Data Forensic Techniques Using
Benford’s Law and Zipf’s Law for
Keystroke Dynamics
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, we investigate the use of Power laws (Benford’s law and Zip’s
law) for keystroke data in differentiating behaviour between human beings and
non-human beings. The new contribution in this chapter is the proposed use
of Power laws (Benford’s law and Zip’s law) for behavioural biometrics (e.g.
keystroke data). Lastly, Benford’s law is used to differentiate between keystroke
data generated by human from non-humans.
5.2 Introduction to Keystrokes Data
Crimes related to computers have increased significantly in the past decade. It is
very important to determine who, what, where, when and how computer related
crimes have happened. One of such computer related crimes is linked with in-
truders or non-humans generating keystroke data to by-pass logins into computer
systems [131]. Forensic tools and techniques can be used to help with criminal
investigations (such as operational troubleshooting, log monitoring, data recov-
ery, data acquisition, due diligence and regulatory compliance) [164].
There are ethical issues related to keystroke data. Most companies have poli-
cies in place that give them the right to collect employees keystroke data. Some
of the companies/organisations include Bloomberg, collect employees keystroke
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data to monitor staff activities [165]. In 2012, Tate publishing and Enterprises
fired 25 employees of wrong doings in the company which reporters claimed that
a monitoring software was installed to capture keystrokes and screen shots of
employees [166]. Therefore, there exist some real cases of companies collect-
ing keystroke data for monitoring purposes. In this chapter, we investigate data
forensic techniques using Benford’s law and Zipf’s law focusing on log-monitoring
of keystroke data.
5.3 Motivation for Zipf’s Law
Zipf’s law was first proposed by American Linguist George K. Zipf in 1935 [126].
Zipf stated that given some corpus of natural language utterances, the frequency
of any word is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency table [126].
Newman [33] further explained that when considering the probability of measur-
ing a particular quantity (in our case, latency/duration of keystrokes) and such
quantity varies inversely as a power of that value, such quantity is said to follow
Zipf’s law [33]. This could be expressed mathematically as:
p(x) = Cx−α (5.1)
where p(x) is the distribution of the quantity x, α is the exponent of the Zipf’s
law and C is a constant [33].
Zipf’s law is considered as a Power law because small occurrences are very com-
mon and large occurrences are very uncommon [33] which depicts the definition
of a Power law. There exist a relationship between the Zipf’s law and the Ben-
ford’s law. Toa [127] and Christelli et al. [34] all noted a relationship between
Zipf’s law and Benford’s law. They found that these laws hold true when the
following conditions are fulfilled:
 All values as positive numbers;
 Variables significantly differ in magnitude;
 Statistics arise from complicated combination of largely independent fac-
tors;
 Variables are not artificially rounded, truncated, or constrained in size
[34] [127].
Since the first publication on Power Laws, a number of natural phenomena have
been found to follow the Power laws. These include the frequency of words used
in any human language [33], the population of cities [33] [128], the intensity of
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earthquakes [33] [128], sizes of power outages [128] and the ranks of people watch-
ing a particular TV station at a time [33] amongst others.
Huang et al. [129] used the Zipf’s law to detect a source of suspicion using in-
trusion detection data sets and showed that it could assist in auditing process.
They showed that the Zipf’s law could distinguish between normal and abnormal
data from an intrusion detection system on networks [129]. Both Benford’s law
and Zipf’s law have been used to assist in detecting anomalies [33]. From our
literature search and to our best knowledge, the use of Benford’s law and Zipf’s
law has not been applied on keystroke data sets.
5.4 Fitting of Distribution of Data to Power Law
According to Newman [33] and Kalankesh et al. [130], the best method to test if
a data set x fits a Power law is by calculating a cumulative distributive function
(CDF) for such data. Thus, the exponent becomes α −1 as given in Equation 5.2
and not α as given in Equation 5.1.
P (x) = C
∫ ∞
x
x′−α dx′ =
C
α− 1x
−(α−1) (5.2)
When considering keystroke data sets, which are real numbers, we consider a
continuous distributions of a Power law and not discrete distributions because it
holds true only for discrete sets of values which are usually positive numbers [128].
Assume that a continuous Power law distribution for a quantity x can be ex-
pressed as:
P (x)dx = Pr(x ≤ X < x+ dx) = Cx−αdx (5.3)
where C is the normalisation constant, X is the observed value and x is the data
ranked from bigger values to smaller values [128] as seen in Equation 5.3. A
Power law holds only for some values of x and the smallest value to which the
Power law holds is usually a minimum value (xmin).
In [33] [128] and [130] we learn that the steps to determine whether a data set
fits a Power law are:
 Calculate xmin and scaling parameter α. The best way to determine xmin
is by using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistics [167] which works by
obtaining the maximum distance between the CDFs of the data and the
fitted model, as given below:
D = max
x≥xmin
|S(x)− P (x)| (5.4)
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where S(x) is the CDF for the data considering observations at least at
xmin and P (x) is the CDF for the Power law model considering only the
region at x > xmin.
The best method to fit a Power law distribution to an observed data is by us-
ing themaximum likelihood [168] and hence the maximum likelihood es
timators (MLE) for the scaling parameter can be derived using the for-
mula:
αˆ = 1 + n
[
n∑
i=1
ln
xi
xmin
]−1
(5.5)
where xi are the considered data values, with i ranging from 1...n are the
observed values for x which considers only values of x > xmin [128].
 Calculate the goodness-of-fit between the data and the Power law which
produces a P-value to ascertain if a dataset follows a Power law or not.
The P-value shows the extent to which the data sets fits a Power law and if
the P-value is greater than 0.1, then the Power law is an acceptable model
for such a dataset, else it is not.
 Using a likelihood ratio test, compare the Power law with the alternative
hypothesis. This is performed by comparing the (log) likelihood ratio of
the Power law distribution to a log-normal distribution or exponential dis-
tribution.
5.5 Experiments
In this experiment, we use the duration which is the time between when a key is
pressed down and when it is released. Also, the latency which is the time elapsed
between the release of the first key and pressing down of the next key is used.
These features are generated when individuals use the keyboard for typing and
this explains the reason why they are chosen. The main goal of the experiments
is to investigate the latency and duration of keystroke data to determine whether
they follow the standard Benford’s law and Zipf’s Law. The second goal of the
experiments is to calculate the divergence of the standard Benford’s law and P-
value for the Zipf’s law.
We use the divergence metrics (as given in Equation 3.5) in our experiments
to measure the extent of both latency and duration of keystroke data depart
from the standard Benford’s Law. In this case P
′
(x) is the actual first digit
probability of the latency and duration used in the experiments and P (x) is the
standard Benford’s law as given in Equation (3.1). We use the Matlab Power law
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package developed by Clauset et al. [128] to estimate xmin, exponent of the Zipf’s
distribution α and the P − value for the latency and duration of keystroke data
sets. The Zipf’s law was found to completely fail for rank >1000 [33]. This is
because the probability of encountering the most common word (say rth word) is
given by P (r) = 0.1/r, where r goes up to 1000. This law breaks down after 1000
because the harmonic series diverges when there exists less frequent words [169].
Hence, for our experiments, 1000 repetitions are performed on the latency and
duration to achieve the P-value.
5.5.1 Data Set
We use the benchmark data set developed by Killourhy and Maxion, CMU [4]
which consists of keystroke-timing for 51 subjects and typing 400 times of the
password “.tie5Roanl”. The database consists of duration and latency. For our
experiments, we use the absolute values for the latency and duration because
latency can be negative if somebody types so fast that the next key is already
pressed down before he/she releases the previous key.
By keystroke data, we mean keystroke-timings information collected from sub-
jects, with each subject typing a particular password (e.g. .tie5Roanl) a number
of times (e.g. 400 times). For example, as shown in Figure 5.1, considering a sin-
gle subject (say subject 1) holding down the ‘t’ key for 0.1491 seconds produces
the duration for the ‘t’ key; the time between pressing the ‘t’ key and the ‘i’ key
produces the keydown-keydown time; the time between releasing the ‘t’ key and
pressing the ‘i’ key produces the keyup-keydown time (also called latency).
 
t i 
 Duration 
Holding down the ‘t’ key 
 
Latency 
Time between releasing the ‘t’ key 
and pressing the ‘i’ key 
Keydown-Keydown 
Time between pressing the ‘t’ key and 
the ‘i’ key 
Figure 5.1: Keystroke timing features
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5.6 Results for Standard and Generalised Benford’s Law
From the experiments, Figure 5.2 shows that the latency follows the standard
Benford’s law and that duration deviates from the standard Benford’s law. We
also observe that the keydown-keydown follows the generalised Benford’s law as
defined in Section 3.1. Even though the duration does not follow the Benford’s
law, it follows a particular pattern of intersecting at digit 2, which we will discuss
via a model in Section 5.7.
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Figure 5.2: Keyup-Keydown (latency) follows standard Benford’s law, Keydown-
Keydown follows Generalised Benford’s law, where as duration deviates from Benford’s
law (CMU database [4])
Moreover, the keyup-keydown (latency) and keydown-keydown are shown to fol-
low the Zipf’s law in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.5. Whereas, the duration does not
follow the Zipf’s as seen in Figure 5.4. To further confirm that the latency and
keydown-keydown follows the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law, Table 5.1 shows the
divergence of latency and duration for the standard Benford’s law with respect
to the database used.
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Figure 5.3: Keyup-Keydown (latency) of the keystroke data follows Zipf’s law for CMU
database [4]
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Figure 5.4: Duration of the keystroke data does not follow Zipf’s law for CMU
database [4]
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Figure 5.5: Keydown-keydown of the keystroke data also follows Zipf’s law for CMU
database [4]
Quantity Divergence
Keyup-Keydown (latency) 0.0008
Keydown-Keydown 0.029
Duration 0.05
Table 5.1: Divergence values for Keystroke data
Table 5.2 shows the P-values, xmin, (α) and L to determine if the latency and
durations follow the Zipf’s law.
Quantity P-
value
Lower
bound
(xmin)
Scaling ex-
ponent (α)
L(log-
likelihood)
Keyup-
Keydown
(latency)
0.7770 0.9801 4.26 -202.36
Keydown-
Keydown
0.6230 0.9880 4.42 -126.87
Duration 0.0160 0.1818 9.42 6116.94
Table 5.2: P-value, Lower bound (xmin) and Scaling exponent (α) for Keystroke data
Fu et. al. [5] achieved a divergence of 0.0034 using DCT coefficients of UCID
images. Qadir et. al. [103] used DWT coefficients of UCID images and achieved
a divergence of 0.0016. Iorliam et. al. [104] used DCT coefficients of face images
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and fingerprint images and achieved divergence values of 0.000917 and 0.000064,
respectively. A comparison of divergence values from [5] [103] and [104] with
the latency divergence value of 0.0008 indicates a good fitting of latency to the
Benford’s law. Furthermore, at any given time, the p-value achieved from a
quantity is typically greater than 0.1, such a quantity fits the power law. From
Table 5.2, we see that the latency and keydown-keydown have p-values greater
than 0.1.
5.7 Modeling and Analysis of Benford’s Law
In this section, the first digit distribution of the duration values is modelled and
analysed. A regression where the relationship between the independent variable
and the dependent variable, modeled as an nth order polynomial is known as
polynomial regression.
Here, we model the probability for the first two digits of duration values us-
ing linear regression (n = 1) and for the digits 3 to 9 using polynomial regression
of order n = 3. If x ∈ {1, 2}, we model P(x) with one regression line, otherwise
we model P(x) with another regression line.
Let x1 and x2 represent the first two digits and the remaining digits, respec-
tively.
x1 = 1, 2 (5.6)
x2 = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 (5.7)
Let y1 and y2 be the polynomial regression models of the order n = 1 and n = 3,
respectively. The corresponding equations are given as follows:
y1 = −0.31x1 + 0.62 (5.8)
and
y2 = −0.00151882x32 + 0.023244x22 − 0.074579x2 + 0.072427 (5.9)
The combination of Equation (5.6) and Equation (5.7) on the x-axis and Equation
(5.8) and Equation (5.9) on the y-axis show a good fit as shown in the Figure 5.6,
indicating that the modeled probability fitted well with the original probability
derived from the duration values.
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Figure 5.6: Linear Regression of order n=1 and Polynomial Regression of order n=3
.
As shown in Figure 5.6, even though the duration of keystroke data from humans
does not follow the Benford’s law, a deviation from this pattern could still assist
administrators in detecting anomalies in the log in patterns of their employees.
5.8 Results and Discussion
From our experiments, we showed that without training, the latency of keystroke
data sets followed the standard Benford’s law and the keydown-keydown followed
the generalised Benford’s law. Even though the duration deviated from the Ben-
ford’s law, the duration from humans followed a combination of linear regression
and polynomial regression. We found that the divergence of 0.0008 was achieved
for keyup-keydown (latency), 0.029 for keydown-keydown and 0.05 for duration
from the keystroke data sets used in our experiments. From our observation, the
smaller the divergence, the better the fitting of a particular data sets to the Ben-
ford’s law [5]. Moreover, the latency for the database used has a better fitting,
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followed by keydown-keydown and then duration.
As can be seen in Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.5, the CDF represented as Pr(x) is
plotted as a function of frequency (x) for the latency and duration values of the
keystroke data. The straight line (black line) shows the section of the plots where
the Power law provided a good model fit [128] of the data considered. We observe
that the latency for the database follows the Zipf’s law but not the duration. The
P-value given in Table 5.2 shows that the keyup-keydown (latency) and keydown-
keydown all follow the Zipf’s law, whereas the duration of the database does not
follow the Zipf’s law. This is based on the condition that if P > 0.1, then such a
quantity fits the Power law, else it does not.
Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that:
 Benford’s law and Zipf’s law can be applied to keystroke data, however these
laws are more applicable to latency than the duration of the keystroke data.
 Keystrokes data behave the same way for the Benford’s Law and Zipf’s Law
as can be seen from our experiments.
We observe that the latency (which is the time elapsed between release of the
first key and pressing down of the next key) is an important feature that can be
used by administrators for auditing purposes to detect if there exist anomalies in
the way that their employees log into their systems.
5.9 Performance Evaluation of Detecting Keystroke Tim-
ing Features
In order to measure the performance of how keystroke timing features (latency,
keydown-keydown and duration) are detected, we use the AUC value which is
achieved from the ROC curve. Due to fact that Killourhy and Maxion [4], Morales
et. al. [170] and Venugopalan et. al. [171] used distance metrics on the keystroke
features, we also present our performance evaluation results based on Chi-square
divergence values achieved by using the Benford’s law first digit probability dis-
tribution.
Table 5.3 shows the performance of detecting latency vs keydown-keydown, la-
tency vs duration and keydown-keydown vs duration in terms of AUC values.
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Features AUC
Latency vs Keydown-Keydown 0.776408
Latency vs Duration 0.807990
Keydown-Keydown vs Duration 0.749345
Table 5.3: AUC values for detecting keystroke timing features
It is actually not trivial to compare our detection performance with existing
methods. This is because most of the existing methods are based on training
and testing the keystroke timing features. The performance is then evaluated
in terms of EER, AUC or genuine accept rates (GAR) values. Even though, we
cannot directly compare our detection results with other existing methods, we
choose three closely related methods for comparison. We compare our results
with Killourhy and Maxion [4], Morales et. al. [170] and Venugopalan et. al.
[171]. Killourhy and Maxion [4] is chosen because they produced a benchmark for
comparing detectors with respect to keystroke dynamics. Furthermore, Morales
et. al. [170] is chosen because the keystroke timing features they used are similar
with the features used in our investigation. Additionally, Venugopalan et. al. [171]
is chosen because it considered liveness detection on keystroke dynamics which
is very important for spoof-resistance biometric authentication. Venugopalan
et. al. [171] proposed the use of electromyography (EMG) signals and keystroke
features to avoid spoofing in keystroke biometric authentication.
Table 5.4 compares our proposed method detection accuracy with these three
existing methods.
Method Training or
No-Training
Best Detection
Accuracy
Detection
Accuracy (%)
Our proposed Method No-Training 0.807990 (AUC) 80.7990
Killourhy and
Maxion [4]
Training 9.600000 (EER) 90.4000
Morales et. al. [170] Training 2.400000 (EER) 97.6000
Venugopalan
et. al. [171]
Training 0.994000 (GAR) 99.4000
Table 5.4: Comparison of Our Proposed Method With Three Existing Methods
As can be seen from Table 5.3, without training our method achieved the highest
AUC value of 0.807990 and lowest AUC value of 0.749345. These results show a
good separability between the keystroke timing features.
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5.10 Summary
In this chapter, we demonstrated that the latency of keystroke data from hu-
mans followed both the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law. From the experiments, a
deviation in this latency pattern could be suspected to come from a non-human.
Moreover, our experiments strongly supported our conjecture that the behavior
of the keystroke data sets was similar for both Power laws (Benford’s law and
Zipf’s law). Divergence value of 0.0008 was achieved for the latency of keystrokes,
indicating a good fitting to the Benford’s law. The Zipf’s law P-value of 0.7770
was achieved for the latency of keystrokes data. Finally, our method achieved
the highest AUC value of 0.807990 and lowest AUC value of 0.749345. The
main application of this work can be used to assist administrators in handling
the large volumes of logging data sets generated from employees of a particular
company/organisation.
Chapter 6
Power Laws for Network Traffic
Analysis
In this chapter, we investigate and analyse the application of Power laws (Ben-
ford’s law and Zipf’s law) on the TCP flow size difference to assist in detecting
malicious traffic on the Internet. The following sections give an introduction to
the Benford’s law, Zipf’s law and how these laws applies to the flow size differ-
ence of network traffic data. Furthermore, experiments using the Benford’s law
and Zipf’s law on the flow size difference are discussed. The contribution to this
chapter is the proposed use of Power laws (Benford’s law and Zipf’s law) for IDS
purposes.
6.1 Introduction
The advances of networking technologies have made the whole world (computers,
people and things) far more connected than before, but the increasing connectiv-
ity has also lead to more opportunities to malicious attackers who find various
ways to launch cyber attacks such as DDoS attacks [172], botnets [173], net-
work worms [174], and phishing attacks (e.g. phishing emails and rogue WiFi
access points) [175]. The increasing harm of network attacks have become so
severe that such attacks have been becoming more and more frequent and so-
phisticated [176] [177]. Therefore, statistical characteristics of network traffic
have recently attracted a significant amount of research interest due to the rich
amount of information transmitted over the Internet which includes data gener-
ated by attacks as well. Using Benford’s law and Zipf’s law for statistical analysis
of network traffic is one way to detect malicious traffic on the Internet. Prior work
on the statistical analysis of network traffic using Power laws have been carried
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out by Faloutsos et al. [178], Mahanti et al. [179] and Mierlo et al. [180]. Falout-
sos et al. [178] showed that the Power law holds for snapshots of the Internet
between November 1997 and December 1998. Mahanti et al. [179] reviewed how
the Power law has improved the design and performance of Internet-based sys-
tems. Furthermore, they stated some implications of power-laws in computer
networks. Such implications include the use of Power laws in web caching, search
schemes, business practices, system designs and measurement issues with respect
to the authenticity of Power laws. Mierlo et al. [180] showed that mechanisms of
digital health care social networks follow a Power law. This has an implication
in helping managers in establishing budgets and expenditures in a health care
setting. However, to the best of our knowledge, Benford’s law, Zipf’s law and
network traffic metrics such as flow size difference have not been previously in-
vestigated.
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law to
network traffic data, with emphasis on the flow size difference. This will assist
in detecting malicious traffic in the Internet and can be used for traffic modeling
and intrusion detection purposes.
In this chapter, we address the following questions:
 Is Benford’s Law applicable to TCP flow size difference of network traffic
data?
 Can the TCP flow size difference of network traffic data assist in detecting
malicious traffic in the Internet?
 Is Zipf’s Law applicable to TCP flow size difference of network traffic data?
 Does network traffic data behave the same way for the Benford’s Law and
Zipf’s Law?
6.2 Network Traffic Analysis and IDS
Krugel et al. [28] defined Intrusion Detection (ID) as the process of identify-
ing and responding to malicious activities targeted at computing and network
resources. Sperotto and Pras [39] classified IDS systems into misuse based or
anomaly based. Both misuse-based IDS and anomaly-based IDS have advan-
tages and disadvantages. Even though misuse-based IDS has the advantage of
being accurate, it cannot detect new attacks. This is because the misuse-based
IDS works by using already predefined set of rules from previous intrusion sce-
narios and new attacks usually have a different signature, hence by-passing these
systems. In contrast, anomaly-based IDS can potentially detect even new at-
tacks, however, it has a disadvantage of classifying some deviations that are not
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malicious as malicious [39] [181]. Due to the advantages exhibited by anomaly-
based IDS, it is a preferred approach for IDS research and development [31] [182].
Anomaly-based techniques are classified into statistically based, knowledge based
and machine based [29] [182]. For statistically based approaches, there are meth-
ods proposed, reviewed by Bhuyan et al. [183]. These methods are either packet-
based or flow-based methods. A detail review by Bhuyan et al. [183] described
several packet-based approaches. For example, Eskin [184] used learned prob-
ability distribution to detect anomaly over noisy data. Furthermore, Chan et
al. [185] used a rule learning algorithm and clustering algorithm to identify nor-
mal behaviour and also outliers for anomaly detection. Simmross-Wattenberg et
al. [186] classified network traffic patterns based on generalised likelihood ratio
test which was used for anomaly detection. All of these examples are packet-
based methods for IDS. However, Bhuyan et al. [183] noted that only a single
research carried out by Lu and Ghorbani [187] used both packet-based and flow-
based approach with wavelet analysis as a detection method. Power laws are also
referred to as “natural” laws because many natural processes often follow them
while artificially created ones tend to not. Since attacks are normally artificially
crafted and mostly generate “unnatural” network traffic, those natural laws can
often form the basis (or part) of an anomaly-based IDS.
In the next section, we will provide reasons for choosing flow-based approaches
with a focus on Benford’s law and Zipf’s law in this chapter.
6.2.1 Flow Based IDS
One of the major challenges faced by IDS systems is related to handling of high
volumes of data due to today’s high speed network [39] [188]. In view of this chal-
lenge, Sperotto and Pras [39] and Bejtlich [189] suggested the use of flow-based
approaches for IDS purposes which consumed less amount of resources rather than
packet-based approaches which required high resource consumption [39] [189]. We
also use flow-based approach with the aim of investigating a possibility of detect-
ing attacks using the flow size of network traffic.
Steinberger et al. stated that flow based anomaly detection systems are not
commonly used [190]. Lakhina et al. used Principal Component Analysis to
diagnose network-wide traffic anomalies [191]. There are IDS methods [38] [39]
developed for network traffic analysis. For example, Drasˇar et al. proposed a new
network anomalies taxonomy and a classification of flow-based detection meth-
ods based on similarity-orientation [38]. Sperotto et al. detected anomalies in
network traffic based on flow-based time series [39]. However, the attackers are
constantly evolving their methods and are able to bypass many of the existing
methods. The important distinguishing feature of our research discussed in this
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chapter is the investigation of a new network flow metric “flow size difference”,
using the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law for IDS purposes. In the next section, we
will clarify what we mean by a network flow and TCP flow.
6.3 Network Flows and TCP Flows
A network flow, which may sometimes be called a session, a stream, or a con-
versation, is a sequence of network packets sharing some common criteria such
as two end-point IP addresses over the Internet [189] [192] [193] [194]. In prin-
ciple, the network flow concept can be applied to any network protocol at any
layer of a network. This concept has been widely used for network traffic moni-
toring purposes, and a specific protocol called NetFlow working at the IP layer
was popularized by Cisco due to its widely deployed routers, which was later
developed into Internet Protocol Flow Information Export (IPFIX), an Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard defined in a series of RFCs [194]. A
flow does not necessarily correspond to a single communication session as defined
by the underlying protocol, e.g. Fredj et al. [192] defined a flow as a collection
of packets transmitting a complete document (such as a web page) and one def-
inition Barakat et al. used in [192] is “a stream of packets having the same/24
destination address prefix”.
While there are many different ways to define a network flow, one of the most
common definition uses the following five criteria: source and destination IP ad-
dresses, source and destination port numbers (0 for protocols that do not use
ports) and protocol type. When we talk about “source” and “destination” it is
clear that the flow defined is unidirectional, which is the case for NetFlow and
IPFIX flows. However, as Bejtlich pointed out in [189], connection-oriented pro-
tocols (e.g. TCP) are more suited to be represented as a flow as compared to
connectionless protocols (e.g. IP, UDP and ICMP). This is because the former
are structured in such a way that there exists a clear beginning, middle and end
to a TCP session, whereas the latter are not structured around the concept of
connections, so often time expiration conditions have to be used to arbitrarily set
flow boundaries. For connection-oriented protocols, each connection corresponds
to a bidirectional flow which is the merge of the two unidirectional flows.
In flow-based IDSs different flow definitions are used. IP flows defined following
NetFlow or IPFIX specifications are widely used [195] since such flow informa-
tion can often be obtained directly from routers and supported by open-source
tools such as NFDUMP [196] and NfSen [197]. Some researchers focused on bidi-
rectional TCP flows only [31], which can be justified by the fact that most IP
traffic over the Internet is TCP traffic (e.g. in [198] the ratio was reported to be
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95.112%).
In this thesis, we also focused on bidirectional TCP flows as Arshadi and Ja-
hangir did in their work on [31] considering the dominance of TCP flows on
the Internet and the fact that network flows are less well-defined for IP and
other connectionless protocols. Note that selecting TCP flows naturally cover all
application-layer protocols based on TCP (such as HTTP, the dominating pro-
tocol at the application layer [198]).
When working with a pcap file captured by libpacap or WinPcap, the TCP
flows we work with can be generated using the following command line with
tshark (a command-line utility provided with WireShark): tshark -r <input
pcap file> -q -z conv,tcp > <output file>. The output file will then con-
tain a list of “TCP conversations” which is a term used by WireShark to denote
TCP flows.* In WireShark’s user interface, TCP flows of a given network traf-
fic dataset can be obtained via the menu item “Statistics” → “Conversation”
and then click “TCP” tab. Then the TCP flows shown in the interface can
be exported using “Copy” button at the bottom. The TCP flow obtained this
way contains the following attributes (those in boldface are essential for our
work): source IP address, source port number, destination IP address, destina-
tion port number, total number of packets transferred between source
and destination, total number of bytes transferred between source and
destination, packets transferred from source to destination, bytes transferred
from source to destination, packets transferred from destination to source, bytes
transferred from destination to source, relative start time (as a timestamp, 0
= the beginning of the whole network traffic), duration, source-to-destination
bitrate (bit per second) and destination-to-source bitrate. When working with
other network traffic data, as long as we can extract the above attributes of each
TCP flow in boldface, our proposed method will work without problem.
6.4 Application to Network Traffic Analysis
6.4.1 Method Description
There are currently a few proposed statistical approaches for network traffic
anomalies [31] [32] [199]. Staniford et al. investigated network traffic packets
and used clustering to identify anomalous portscan packets [199]. Dewaele et
al. [32] analysed a large scale packet trace database using random projection
techniques (sketches) and a multiresolution non-gaussian marginal distribution
modeling for anomaly detection and characterisation. Arshadi and Jahangir [31]
*WireShark uses another term “TCP stream” to denote the payload of a “TCP conversa-
tion”. To avoid confusion we will use the term “TCP flow” consistently in this chapter.
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showed that Benford’s law could be applied to the inter-arrival times of TCP for
normal traffic and a deviation could be considered as an anomaly. In this chapter,
we consider the typical structure of an anomaly-based IDS working with TCP
flows. Our approach starts with one or more selected metrics which should follow
Benford’s law closely for normal TCP flows but deviate from it significantly and
consistently for malicious ones. Then, a number of samples of each selected met-
ric will be collected (one per TCP flow) to detect any significant deviation from
Benford’s law, where we will use a sliding window to cover a sufficient number of
TCP flows (i.e., samples of the metric) so that any deviation can be detected with
high confidence and an acceptable temporal resolution (which will help tailor the
detection accuracy as well especially to balance false positive and false negative
rates). The flow window size W will be a system parameter and it can be fixed
or dynamically adapted depending on the nature of the networking environment
being monitored. The deviation will be calculated based on a similarity metric
between the Benford’s law and the actually observed distribution, which is used
as a feature for a binary classifier to classify each flow window into two classes:
normal (non-malicious) and malicious (attack). Some attacks investigated in this
chapter are DDoS and port scanning attacks.
If we have more than one usable metric, each one can be used alone or they
can be combined to inform a classifier handling multiple features or the alerts
generated from each metric are pooled to derive a single decision. In this chap-
ter, we look at a simpler setting: each usable metric is used alone and a simple
threshold T is used to construct a binary classifier. We go for the simpler setting
because our main goal here is to identify new metrics that can be used to augment
any IDSs rather than to produce yet another IDS competing with other systems.
We actually do not anticipate our IDS will outperform many other IDSs due to
its simplistic structure. To some extent, the proposed IDS structure is used to
set up a proper context so that we can test the usefulness of the identified metrics
in more complicated IDSs. In our future work we will look at more complicated
settings and how the identified new metrics can be used to improve other IDSs.
We will discuss more about these issues in Section 6.7. Additionally, the flow size
difference will be investigated using the Zipf’s law to detect malicious traffic on
the Internet.
6.4.2 The Metrics
As mentioned in section 6.4.1, the first and the most important component of
our IDS is at least one metric that can work with Benford’s law. Since we aim at
identifying new metric, we do not look at the inter-arrival time already studied by
other researchers [31]. Looking at the attributes of a TCP flow listed at the end
of Section 6.3, we identified two candidate metrics that have not been previously
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studied for IDS:
Flow size: The flow size distribution has been studied extensively in the network-
ing literature and estimation of flow size distribution has been an active research
topic [200] [201]. It has been known that the flow size distribution is typically
long-tailed and its exact form heavily depends on the underlying protocol and
the networking environment [202]. Flow size distribution has been studied in
IDS but mostly for entropy-based approaches where the entropy of the observed
distribution is calculated as a feature for detection [203] [204]. We were unaware
of work linking flow size distribution to Benford’s law so found it interesting to
investigate flow size as a new metric for applying Benford’s law to IDS.
Flow size difference: In addition to flow size, we also found “flow size differ-
ence”, which is defined as the numeric difference of two consecutive TCP flows’
sizes, seems to be another candidate metric of interest because it inherits some
features of flow size (e.g. long-tailedness) but also differs significantly from flow
size itself. We did not find any work on the distribution of flow size difference of
TCP flows or on its application in IDS, which is not totally surprising since flow
size difference does not seem to be obviously useful for network traffic analysis
and management. However, our quick experiments revealed it seemed to follow
Benford’s law, so we added it as a candidate. For flow size difference, we will
ignore the sign bit so the metric we are considering here is actually the absolute
value of the flow size difference. In the following, we will simply use the term
“flow size difference” to denote the absolute value unless otherwise stated.
Note that the flow size can be defined by bytes or packets, so we actually have
two different variants for each of the above two metrics. These two variants are
not linked but cannot be directly derived from each other since the packet size
(in byte) varies over time and across applications. Therefore, we use the two
different variants of the flow size difference metric (flow size as number of byte
and number of packet) in this chapter.
In this chapter, we report our observation that a new network flow metric we
call “flow size difference” follows Benford’s law closely for normal TCP flows but
not for malicious ones. We then propose a new method of applying Benford’s
law to this new metric to build an unsupervised network-based IDS to detect
malicious TCP flows. In addition to having all merits of flow-based IDSs, our
proposed IDS does not require any training and it provides two simple parame-
ters with a clear semantic meaning so that the IDS operator can set and tailor
the parameters intuitively to adjust the performance of the proposed IDS. The
main limitation of the proposed method is that it requires a relatively large time
If we know the flow size distribution, it is possible to derive the distribution of the flow
size difference assuming the flow size is an i.i.d. sequence which is unfortunately not the case
for most cases.
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window of flows (to provide statistical confidence) so its temporal resolution is
relatively low, but this can be overcome by combining it with other IDSs with a
higher temporal resolution (e.g. using the proposed method to detect early alerts
with regions of interest which are then further analysed using other methods).
The proposed IDS was inspired by our observations on statistical analyses of a
large number of TCP flow datasets, and its performance was verified with one
closed and two public datasets.
6.4.3 From Flows to Flow Windows
Since Benford’s law is a distribution, we need to collect enough samples of a
given metric to be able to construct an observed distribution which then can be
compared against the target distribution for detecting deviation. This is why
we need to have a flow window for any distribution-based IDSs, which is a well-
known fact. Since the Benford’s law distribution has only 9 values, it can be
expected that the minimum flow window size will not be very large which will
make sure that the temporal resolution of the IDS is not too low. We will report
our experimental results in Section 6.5 on how the value of the parameter flow
window size (W ) can be determined. In addition to W , there is also another one
“window sliding step” S which defines how the flow window slides. In principle
S can range from 1 to W and taking a smaller value can potentially help refine
the temporal resolution to some extent. In our work, we take S = W/2 as a
representative value.
6.4.4 Analysis on Different Flow Ordering Options
For flow size difference, changing ordering of flows will obviously change each
sample of the metric and thus its observed distribution. For flow size, ordering
will not make a direct difference, but can influence what flows are included in
each flow window thus influence the observed distribution. It is therefore a valid
question to ask if such ordering will make a difference and if so how we should
order flows. Looking at all the attributes of a TCP flow, we selected the following
four typical ordering options for consideration:
1. Start Time, End Time: this ordering criterion considers both the start time
and end time of a flow
2. End Time, Start Time: this ordering criterion considers both the end time
and start time of a flow
3. Source IP address, Source Port number, Destination IP address, Destina-
tion Port number, Start Time: this is a 5-tuple ordering criterion which
considers source IP address, source port number, destination IP address,
destination port number and start time of a flow
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4. Source IP address, Destination IP address, Start Time: this ordering crite-
rion considers the source IP address, destination IP address and start time
of a flow
Each attribute in the above ordering option is considered from the left to right
for ordering. When some flows have the same values for all ordering criteria, the
original order in the raw network traffic log will be kept. Since Benford’s law is
a natural law and scale-invariant, we hypothesized that the ordering should not
have a big impact on the compliance with (for normal flows) or deviation from
(for malicious flows) Benford’s law. Our experimental results will be given in
Section 6.5.
6.4.5 Divergences and Distances
IDS researchers have used different divergence metrics and distances to aid them
for detection purposes. Weller-Fahy et al. discussed that the role of ID was
to ascertain whether the traffic was normal (good) or the traffic was anomalous
(bad) [205].
In their survey on distance and similarity used for network intrusion anomaly,
they identified the types of distance measures to include: (1) Power distances
(2) Distances on distribution laws and (3) Correlation similarities. Examples
of Power distances include Euclidean distance and Manhattan distance. Other
related distances to Power distances are the Mahalanobis distance and the het-
erogeneous distance function. Examples of distances on distribution laws in-
clude Bhattacharya coefficient, χ2-distance, Entropy, Kullback-Leiber distance
and Hellinger distance [205].
Correlation similarities examples include Spearman ρ rank correlation, Kendal τ
rank correlation, Pearson product-moment correlation linear coefficient, Learning
vector quantisation and Cosine similarity with an artificial neural network. Some
other distances such as the Dice similarity, Squared χ2 (also called χ-squared),
and Geodesic distance do not fit into the three categories [205].
For our experiments in this chapter, we first use Chi-square divergence (as re-
ported in Section 6.5) to test whether there exist a difference in the divergence
values achieved from malicious and non-malicious network traffic flows. Chi-
square divergence is first used because it is one of the most common criteria
used [3] [5] [100] [103] [111]. Chi-square divergence used in our experiments as
shown in Equation (3.5). In the performance evaluation of the IDS we also in-
cluded the following metrics in order to find out if there are significant differences
when different metrics are used: Kullback-Leiber divergence (KLD), Euclidean
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distance, Manhattan distance, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient
and cosine similarity. Although all similarity metrics are well-known, we list
them below for the sake of completeness (all defined for Benford’s law following
the same notations as in Equation (3.5)).
 Kullback-Leiber divergence:
KLD =
√√√√ 9∑
x=1
P ′x log2
(
P ′x
Px
)
 Euclidean distance:
ED =
√√√√ 9∑
x=1
(P ′x − Px)2
 Manhattan distance:
MD =
9∑
x=1
∣∣∣P ′x − Px∣∣∣
 Pearson product-moment correlation linear coefficient (x denotes the mean
of x):
CC =
∑9
x=1
(
P
′
x − P ′x
)∑9
x=1
(
Px − Px
)√∑9
x=1
(
P ′x − P ′x
)2√∑9
x=1
(
Px − Px
)2
 Cosine similarity:
CS =
∑9
x=1
(
P
′
xPx
)
√∑9
x=1 P
′2
x
√∑9
x=1 P
2
x
All the experiments using these divergence and distances are implemented using
MATLAB R2015a.
6.5 Experimental Setup and Results
6.5.1 Datasets Used for Our Experiments
To properly test the new metrics, we used three groups of network traffic datasets
in our experiments. The first group are datasets that do not contain known ma-
licious traffic (so considered as normal/non-malicious). The second group are
datasets containing known malicious traffic. The third group are datasets with
unlabeled mixed traffic with both malicious and non-malicious flows. All datasets
were pre-processed using tshark to get bidirectional TCP flows.
Non-malicious traffic datasets considered in our experiments include:
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1. LBNL and ICSI dataset [206]: This dataset has packets spanned for more
than 100 hours of activity from a total of several thousand internal hosts.
2. UNB ISCX 2012 Intrusion Detection Dataset: We consider two dataset
here that are non-malicious. Traffic on Friday (11/6/2010) has normal
activity and non-malicious flows with 297,398 TCP flows. Secondly, traffic
on Wednesday (16/6/2010) also has normal activity and non-malicious flows
with 434,674 TCP flows [198].
3. TLERH dataset: This dataset has captured data volume of 6 Gbytes, for a
duration of 43 hours that contains 12 million packets [207].
4. Other publicly available non-malicious traffic datasets used in our experi-
ments are from PCAP traces [40].
The malicious datasets considered in our experiments include:
1. Capture hacker dataset: We use captured malware traffic of three honeypot
PCAP files with different setups namely NAPENTHES, HONEYBOT and
AMAZON [208].
2. 2009 CDX dataset: This dataset includes packet captures generated by
National Security Agency (NSA) Red Team activity [209].
3. MACCDC dataset: This dataset has normal flows with periodic attacks
from a volunteer Red Team. We randomly picked 4 pcap files from this
repository [210].
4. Labeled dataset for intrusion detection: The dataset has honeypot flow
information of traffic in the network of the University of Twente [211].
5. Kyoto University Benchmark Data: It has 24 statistical features; 14 conven-
tional features and 10 additional features. 14 of these features are extracted
based on KDD Cup 99 dataset which are basically obtained by honeypot
systems [212].
The first unlabeled mixed datasets of non-malicious and malicious traffic used
for our experiments are from UNB ISCX 2012 intrusion detection dataset. They
include data traffics of:
 Sunday (13/6/2010) which has 221,026 TCP flows with 20,358 attacked
flows.
 Monday (14/6/2010) which has 122,298 TCP flows with 3,771 attacked
flows.
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 Tuesday (15/6/2010) which has 441,563 TCP flows with 37,378 attached
flows.
 Thursday (17/6/ 2010) which has 329,378 TCP flows with 5,203 attacked
flows [198].
The second mixed dataset is ISOT dataset which comprises of existing publicly
available malicious and non-malicious datasets [213].
6.5.2 Flow Size or Flow Size Difference
The first phase of the experiment we conducted is to determine if both flow size
and flow size difference are promising metrics for IDS purposes. We use one
dataset from each of the three groups to gain insights about their potentials.
Table 6.1 summarises the results, which show that flow size difference seems to
follow Benford’s law better than flow size although for both cases the expected
order of the χ2 divergence values were observed: non-malicious < mixed < mali-
cious. We also repeated this experiment with some other datasets and observed
largely the same pattern, therefore we decided to choose flow size difference for
other experiments. The potential of using flow size is not totally excluded but
we leave it for our future work.
Table 6.1: χ2 divergence values for flow size vs. flow size difference as the metric.
Dataset (File)
Metric
Flow Size Flow Size Difference
LBNL/ICSI 0.23211 0.00789
Capture Hacker (HONEYBOT) 1.09218 0.35986
ISCX 2012 (13/06/2012) 0.69808 0.02574
6.5.3 How to Determine Flow Window Size
As we discussed in section 6.4.3, the flow window size W is a parameter of the
IDS which can allow some level of performance control. While we expected W
does not need to be too large, we need some indication of how we can set it.
For a selected dataset (LBNL/ICSI dataset), we thus calculated the average χ2
divergence value of all flows when the flow window size W changes from 500 to
20,000, increasing with a step size of 250. Figure 6.1 shows the results. As can be
seen, the average χ2 divergence value decreases rapidly initially but the decreasing
rate keeps dropping while W increases. Note that the initial divergence value is
also very small (below 0.02) so the results suggest W can probably be set to a
value between several hundred or thousand in most cases.
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Figure 6.1: Change of χ2 divergence w.r.t. flow window size W .
6.5.4 TCP Flow Ordering
In this section, the ordering of flows will be investigated to see whether it has
an effect on how flow size difference follows the Benford’s law. For non-malicious
flows in the LBNL/ICSI dataset, the average χ2 divergence values for all four or-
dering options listed in Section 6.4.4 are: 0.03354, 0.03416, 0.03192 and 0.03362,
all below 0.03. For malicious flows in the HONEYBOT dataset, the average χ2
divergence values are 0.36906, 0.35287, 0.33000 and 0.35663, all above 0.3. Re-
peated experiments on other malicious and non-malicious datasets gave similar
results, so we can see that the flow ordering does not really change the χ2 diver-
gence value, thus suggesting that flow size difference is a robust metric against
flow ordering.
6.5.5 More Results on Different Datasets
The above experiments clarified that flow size difference is a good metric working
with Benford’s law. To test its potential further, we ran a large-scale experiment
to calculate χ2 divergence values for a large number of TCP flows of many datasets
in all the three groups. Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 show the results for the three
different groups of datasets, respectively. Note that the χ2 divergence values of
different datasets should be compared directly as those datasets correspond to
completely different networking environments and capturing methods. Despite
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the diversity of the datasets and the observable fluctuations of the χ2 divergence
values especially the maximum values, largely speaking the χ2 divergence value
does have a high tendency to following the following order: non-malicious <
mixed < malicious. This suggests flow size difference may indeed be a good
metric for building an anomaly-based IDS for detecting malicious flows.
Table 6.2: χ2 divergence values for datasets with non-malicious TCP flows.
Dataset (File) Window-Size
χ2 divergence
Average Median Minimum Maximum
LBNL/ICSI 2000 0.06086 0.02194 0.00036 3.73021
10000 0.02335 0.01453 0.00079 0.14223
ISCX 2012 (11/6/2010) 2000 0.03548 0.03078 0.00531 0.11843
10000 0.02468 0.02424 0.01413 0.03884
ISCX 2012 (16/6/2010) 2000 0.07623 0.03926 0.00144 0.78547
10000 0.04398 0.03093 0.00373 0.18447
TLERH 2000 0.06206 0.04660 0.00877 0.17518
10000 0.04680 0.04573 0.03653 0.05830
Pcap Traces
(loc1-20020523-1835) 2000 0.01057 0.00896 0.00126 0.03748
10000 0.00530 0.00528 0.00252 0.00921
(loc1-20020524-1115) 2000 0.00863 0.00792 0.00170 0.02550
10000 0.00321 0.00298 0.00105 0.00653
(loc2-20030513-1005) 2000 0.01727 0.01570 0.00310 0.05432
10000 0.00691 0.00691 0.00691 0.00691
(loc2-20030513-1044) 2000 0.04595 0.04072 0.01591 0.09965
10000 0.02966 0.02966 0.02966 0.02966
(loc3-20030902-0930) 2000 0.01848 0.01758 0.00430 0.03842
10000 0.01234 0.01264 0.00855 0.01662
(loc3-20030902-1005) 2000 0.01574 0.01576 0.00275 0.03699
10000 0.01137 0.01141 0.00648 0.01682
(loc4-20040204-2145) 2000 0.01770 0.01737 0.00115 0.04557
10000 0.01317 0.01434 0.00137 0.02149
(loc4-20040205-0410) 2000 0.01998 0.01925 0.00238 0.05784
10000 0.01512 0.01632 0.00123 0.02550
(loc5-20031205-1431) 2000 0.04746 0.04571 0.01340 0.09680
10000 0.04198 0.04207 0.03003 0.05681
(loc5-20031206-0731) 2000 0.08954 0.08395 0.04891 0.18042
10000 0.07028 0.07102 0.06119 0.07695
(loc6-20070501-2055) 2000 0.06028 0.04257 0.00312 0.74296
10000 0.04050 0.03623 0.01130 0.14532
(loc6-20070531-2043) 2000 0.06458 0.04797 0.00358 0.90895
10000 0.04812 0.03955 0.00907 0.19312
6.6 IDS Performance Evaluation
In this section we provide details of our further experiments to evaluate the
performance of a simple IDS built on top of the identified flow size difference
metric. As we mentioned above, the IDS has only one metric and its structure is
94 CHAPTER 6. POWER LAWS FOR NETWORK TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
Table 6.3: χ2 divergence values for datasets with malicious TCP flows.
Dataset (File) Window-Size
χ2 divergence
Average Median Minimum Maximum
Capture Hacker
(HONEYBOT) 2000 0.35986 0.35986 0.35986 0.35986
(AMAZON) 2000 0.54118 0.66649 0.29142 0.77195
(NAPENTHES) 2000 0.77923 0.77923 0.77923 0.77923
2009 CDX
(dmp1) 2000 0.41638 0.39082 0.15523 0.69919
(dmp2) 2000 0.53069 0.45369 0.23580 1.03266
(dmp3) 2000 1.28681 0.54223 0.14934 8.28480
(dmp4) 2000 0.60792 0.57368 0.24486 1.23878
(35dump*) 2000 3.59944 1.08522 0.05952 12.11948
(35dump2*) 2000 0.53069 0.45369 0.23580 1.03266
MACCDC
(MACC1) 2000 0.56174 0.49859 0.03080 2.47686
10000 0.36168 0.30968 0.09280 0.66531
(MACC2) 2000 0.31569 0.34896 0.04497 0.73550
10000 0.30172 0.33339 0.07782 0.47961
(MACC3) 2000 0.48010 0.51602 0.07955 1.34011
10000 0.27954 0.27954 0.27954 0.27954
(MACC4) 2000 0.45209 0.41458 0.02987 1.60890
10000 0.31705 0.24440 0.04732 0.91747
Labelled flows 2000 1.01993 0.90067 0.03410 3.79592
10000 0.99995 0.88509 0.07798 3.58846
Kyoto
(20061101) 2000 0.10674 0.09805 0.02955 0.22716
(20061102) 2000 1.06613 1.00048 0.09981 3.15303
(20061103) 2000 0.10819 0.11279 0.05818 0.19531
(20061104) 2000 0.36946 0.44474 0.07109 0.61212
Table 6.4: χ2 divergence values for datasets with mixed malicious and non-malicious
TCP flows.
Dataset (File) Window-Size
χ2 divergence
Average Median Minimum Maximum
ISCX 2012
(13/6/2010) 2000 0.37707 0.08137 0.00190 5.87357
10000 0.20355 0.06338 0.01177 2.26241
(14/6/2010) 2000 0.20078 0.04725 0.00361 3.63736
10000 0.10629 0.03444 0.00806 1.01057
(15/6/2010) 2000 0.12120 0.08677 0.00300 1.19159
10000 0.09664 0.07293 0.00825 0.56655
(17/6/2010) 2000 0.06915 0.059462 0.00734 0.32674
10000 0.04617 0.04309 0.01686 0.09487
ISOT 2000 0.05151 0.02077 0.00090 1.52625
10000 0.01931 0.01380 0.00084 0.41024
simple, so our goal is not to make it outperform other IDSs but to provide evidence
that even with such a single metric, the IDS has a reasonable performance so it
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has the potential to be used with other metrics and methods to design IDSs with
better overall performance.
6.6.1 Datasets Used
As pointed out by many other IDS researchers [38] [214] [215], there is a general
lack of public labelled datasets for evaluating and comparing performance of IDSs.
The two mostly used datasets in the past are the DARPA dataset [216] released
in 1999 (and updated in 2000 with some specific scenarios), and the KDD Cup
1999 dataset [41] which was derived from DARPA dataset. Both datasets have
serious design flaws known to the IDS community for long, and those attacks
presented in the dataset are very out-dated. Their use is in general discouraged
and most researchers go for closed datasets obtained from their own networks or
from industrial collaborators, which are seldom made public thus making precise
reproduction of published results impossible.
In this section, we use the TRT dataset which contains 17 days of network traffic
from a medium-sized network. The dataset contains two subsets. The first subset
was captured in a simulated network, with long periods of (simulated) normal
traffic and occasional attacks of different types. The “inet” probe was located
at the boundary of the network, to intercept all traffic entering and leaving the
network from the Internet. The second subset was from a real student cyber
security laboratory. It contains a lot of background traffic when the students were
not there, but this was largely UDP traffic and hence not used in our testing.
When the students were there, they were doing a lot of (simulated) attacks as
part of their practice and learning and hence there is little “normal” TCP traffic
in these datasets. Putting both subsets together, we have a balanced dataset
with both periods with normal and malicious activities to test our IDS.
In addition to the above TRT dataset, we also decided to test our IDS with two
public datasets: the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [41] and NLD-KDD 2009 dataset [42].
The KDD CUP 1999 dataset has attacked connections and normal connections
simulated in a military network environment and the NLD-KDD 2009 dataset is
a cleaned and re-sampled subset of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset to fix some of its
known problems [217]. The main reason for including these two public datasets
is to provide a minimum level of reproducibility of our results reported in this
chapter.
6.6.2 Dataset Pre-Processing
All the three datasets used have labels at the flow level, but our IDS works at
the flow window level, so we needed to convert the flow labels to flow window
labels. The most natural way of doing the conversion is to introduce a threshold
Tl ∈ {1, · · · ,W} and then label a flow window as malicious if there are at least Tl
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malicious flows. More precisely, assuming a flow window contains W flows whose
labels are {li = 0 or 1}Wi=1 (1 means malicious and 0 means normal), then this
flow window’s label L can be determined as follows:
L = sign
((
W∑
i=1
li
)
− Tl
)
, (6.1)
where
sign(x) =
{
1, if x ≥ 0,
0, otherwise.
Note that the threshold Tl may also be represented as a ratio between 0 and 1:
tl = Tl/W .
6.6.3 Benchmarking Metric
Instead of reporting detection accuracy indicators such as false positive and false
negative rates, we decided to use the AUC of the ROC curve of the threshold-
based IDS as our main benchmarking metric. This is because our IDS has tunable
parameters so reporting accuracy figures alone is not sufficient. We were aware
that the ROC is not the best benchmarking tool for IDSs, but found it more
straightforward to use for our proposed IDS to demonstrate the usefulness of
using flow size difference for IDS purposes. Advanced benchmarking metrics
normally introduce new factors (e.g. costs [218]) or additional steps (e.g. adaptive
thresholding [219]), which we would like to avoid as they can unnecessarily over-
complicate the performance evaluation task. Since we expect flow size difference
as a metric will be used together with other metrics and methods to design more
complicated IDSs, we leave investigation on advanced benchmarking metrics as
our future work.
6.6.4 Experimental Results
We conducted extensive experiments on different parameter settings of the IDS
with the KDD Cup 1999 and TRT datasets and the achieved results are shown
in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. For the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, the window sizes we
tested include 100, 200, 500, 1000, 2500 and 5000, and for the TRT dataset we
tested W = 250 to 5000 with a step size of 250. The unit for the window size
is in hours. In general, our results on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset are very good
but those on the TRT dataset are relatively worse which may be caused by the
normal flows being artificially simulated and attacks were done by students who
were learning cyber security (so both are less natural). All the similarity metrics
worked reasonably well, but it seemed the Euclidean distance performed the best
overall across both datasets and all different settings. The two different variants
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of flow size difference (in byte and in packet) did not seem to perform significantly
differently.
The IDS’s performance has some dependency on the flow window size W and
the threshold Tl (tl), which is expected as the latter can influence the temporal
resolution and both influence the definition on when a flow window is considered
malicious. Note that the threshold Tl (tl) is not an operational parameter as the
IDS manager does not need to adjust it, but it will influence how the performance
of the IDS is interpreted as it influence how malicious flow windows are defined
based on malicious flows.
We also conducted some experiments with the NSL-KDD 2009 dataset, and sur-
prisedly observed some nearly perfect results for tl = 0.5 when χ
2 divergence
was used as the similarity metric (see Figure 6.4 in which one can see the AUC
went up to 1 when W = 5000). When Euclidean distance was used instead, the
performance went to another extreme: the AUC fluctuates around 0.5 suggesting
the IDS failed completely. While we found these results difficult to interpret,
one possible explanation is that the resampling and cleaning mechanisms used
by the authors of this dataset [217] may have introduced strange artifacts into
the data (e.g. the discontinuities caused by such processing) thus making the
result very sensitive to parameters and setting changes. The NSL-KDD 2009
dataset also contains significantly less TCP flows, which implies the results are
less representative.
6.7 Discussion and Future Work
The results of detection accuracy shown above should be seen with caution as
for all the three datasets the attacks are not necessary representative in other
networking environments. The ground-truth labels in the TRT dataset were
manually done by a human expert who looked at the network traffic data without
information of what actually happened during the traffic recording sessions. To
some extent we can consider the TRT dataset’s labels as ratings of a human expert
on suspiciousness of flows, so putting all the results together, we can argue that
the proposed IDS does work in predicting what a human expert would produce.
The fact that the proposed IDS works on both the public datasets (which have
various known drawbacks) and a relatively more recent and independent dataset
implies the proposed method is robust as well. In future we plan to test the
proposed IDS on more datasets to further verify its performance across more
recent datasets. We hope to be able to establish collaboration with some network
service providers to test our method with real-world network traffic and attacks.
We also plan to make use of the automatically labelled (using an ensemble of
automated IDSs) MAWILab dataset [220] to test our work against other IDSs
and a more diverse set of network traffic.
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Figure 6.2: ROC curves of two settings for the KDD Cup 1999 dataset: (a) χ2 divergence,
Tl = 1; (b) Euclidean distance, tl = 0.01.
The proposed measure provides a new metric (flow size difference) one can use to
augment any existing IDSs. Some possible ways to achieve this include: 1) adding
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Figure 6.3: ROC curves of two settings for the TRT dataset: (a) χ2 divergence, Tl = 500;
(b) Euclidean distance, tl = 0.3.
the flow size difference as a new metric into an IDS with some other metrics so
there are more features the classifier can use; 2) using the flow size difference
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Figure 6.4: ROC curves of two settings for the NSL-KDD 2009 dataset with χ2 divergence
and tl = 0.5.
based IDS as an early warning system to trigger other more advanced IDSs to
focus on regions of interests in the network traffic; 3) using the flow size difference
based IDS as a secondary IDS to identify missing attacks; 4) using the flow size
difference based IDS to generate pseudo-labels for semi-supervised training of a
more complicated IDS.
Using the simple form of Benford’s law without any generalization means no pa-
rameter estimation is needed. In addition, the flow size difference based IDS is a
simple threshold based IDS without the need to be trained (which is a common
merit of all distribution based IDSs). The IDS does have some adjustable pa-
rameters but they can be set intuitively and based on observed statistics of the
similarity metric, which can be done by a simple software tool processing all his-
torical flows (both normal and malicious ones). Even when such historical data
is not available, one can still set some initial value and then incrementally adjust
the parameters while normal and malicious flows are being observed. As a whole,
the IDS can be easily deployed without much burden of “making it ready”.
The two main operational parameters of the flow size difference based IDS are:
the classifier’s decision threshold T , the flow window size W . The former can be
used to balance false negative and false positive rates, and the latter to balance
detection accuracy and temporal resolution. Note that W will influence the false
negative and false positive rates as well (as shown in the previous section) but
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in an indirect way. Both parameters have a clear semantic meaning from an IDS
operator’s point of view: 1) T is the deviation from Benford’s law, as measured
by the selected similarity metric; 2) W simply define how many flows one need
to observe before making a decision. Typical initial values of both parameters
can be set to T = 0.3 and W = 1000 according to our experiments on the TRT
dataset. We envisage W is more stable so once a preferred value is set it will
remain for a longer time without the need to be changed, but T may evolve more
quickly especially due to adaptation of attackers to hide their traces.
Assuming the attackers are aware of the use of flow size difference as a metric
for IDS, they can change their attacking strategies so that the network traffic
generated from their attacks will fall below the alerting threshold. There are at
least two possible strategies: 1) adapt the attacks’ network traffic precisely to
match the target distribution, which is often difficult or impossible for attackers
as they normally don’t have any control of other parallel users and network
devices’ activities and attack flows; 2) reduce the level of attack activity so that
it hides well in normal traffic, which effectively leads to a special kind of network-
based information hiding (which will require a completely different treatment for
detection). The second strategy may make some attacks completely meaningless
(harmless) e.g. for DDoS slowing down the incoming traffic will make the attack
itself fail by definition. For some other attacks, the second strategy will normally
be acceptable (e.g. port scanning or online password guess) but will significantly
increase the costs of performing the target attack and the chance of the attack
being captured by other means (e.g. other IDS methods). If launching an attack
requires too much time, the target may also become unavailable e.g. if the target
is a moving object or does not have a permanent network address like a mobile
device.
We focused at bidirectional TCP flows in this chapter. Our initial tests on other
types of network flows such as unidirectional TCP flows seemed to show Benford’s
law may not be applied directly, which can be explained by the observation that
many unidirectional TCP flows are often highly asymmetric (more and larger
packets from server to client). Possible applications to other types of flows such
as IP, ICMP and UDP flows require more work as well since such flows are
normally defined as unidirectional and the sessional boundary is not as clearly
defined as in the TCP case.
In our future work, we will also investigate if and how our work can be generalized
beyond the simple form of Benford’s law. For instance, we will also look at
Benford’s law with a base different from 10, the generalized Benford’s law [5]
and other natural laws such as the Stigler distribution [221] (in case the simple
Benford’s law does not work in some cases e.g. UDP flows). In the next section,
we will investigate and apply Zipf’s law (also a Power law) on the TCP flow size
difference to assist in detecting malicious traffic on the Internet.
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6.8 Zipf’s law for Network Traffic Analysis
The Benford’s law is the most used Power law when dealing with fraud detec-
tion [129]. A related Power law to the Benford’s law is the Zipf’s law. Some
similarities that exist between the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law are that both of
these laws are classified as natural laws [129]. Also, both laws are Power laws [129]
and it is expected that distributions that follow the Benford’s law should also fol-
low the Zipf’s law. Even though both laws have similarities, there exist some
differences between these two laws. The Benford’s law establishes relationship
between digit and frequency. In contrast, the Zipf’s law shows a relationship
between rank and frequency. Another difference that exists between these two
laws is that the Benford’s law applies to numeric attributes, whereas the Zipf’s
law applies to both numeric and string attributes [129].
Our assumption in this Section is that the TCP flow size difference from non-
malicious flows should also follow the Zipf’s law and that TCP flow size difference
from malicious flows should deviate from the Zipf’s law. For our experiments, we
use the TCP flow size difference from malicious dataset (capture the hacker, 2009
CDX dataset-35 dump, 2009 CDX dataset-35 dump2), non-malicious dataset
(LBNL/ICSI, Traffic Lab at Ericsson Research in Hungary dataset) and a mix-
ture of malicious and non-malicious dataset (ISCX 2012 (13/6/2010), ISCX 2012
(14/6/2010)). Figure 6.5 shows the schematic diagram of our proposed method
that applies the Zipf’s law to network traffic data for processing, analysis and
malicious traffic detection.
6.8.1 Zipf’s law for malicious, non-malicious, mixture of malicious
and non-malicious network traffic
Using our proposed Zipf’s law method shown in Figure 6.5, we investigate the
Zipf’s law on the malicious, non-malicious and mixture of malicious and non-
malicious network traffic data. The Zipf’s law plots and the corresponding P-
value for each of the dataset are analysed. As explained in Section 5.4, Clauset
et al. [128] performed experiments using synthetic and real-world datasets and
showed that P-values> 0.1 indicates that such a dataset fits the Power law (in this
case Zipf’s law), else the dataset fails to fit the Power law. Therefore, we also use
this criteria to investigate the conformity of a particular dataset to the Zipf’s law.
From our experiments, Figure 6.6 and Table 6.5 shows that malicious dataset
does not follow the Zipf’s law considering the graphs and P-value.
We further show that the non-malicious dataset follows the Zipf’s law based on
the Zipf’s law graphs and P-values as shown in Figure 6.7 and Table 6.5. Lastly,
a mixture of malicious and non-malicious network traffic data does not follow the
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Figure 6.5: Differentiate Malicious Flows from Non-Malicious Flows using Zipf’s law
Zipf’s law based on the P-values obtained. Even though the Zipf’s law graph
(Figure 6.8) for the mixture of malicious and non-malicious datasets seem to
follow the Zipf’s law, their P-values as shown in Table 6.5 does not follow the
Zipf’s law.
This is an indication that naturally generated network traffic data follows the
Zipf’s law. Whereas network traffic data that is malicious, deviates from this
law.
6.8.2 Comparative Analysis of Zipf’s law and Benford’s law with Im-
plications
In this section, we compare the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law based on our exper-
imental results. Table 6.5 shows a comparison between the Zipf’s law P-values
and the Benford’s law Chi-square divergence values with respect to the window
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Figure 6.6: Zipf’s law for the malicious flow size difference of: (a) capture the hacker;
(b) 2009 CDX dataset-35 dump; (c) 2009 CDX dataset-35 dump2.
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Figure 6.7: Zipf’s law for the non-malicious flow size difference of: (a) LBNL and ICSI
dataset; (b) Traffic Lab at Ericsson Research in Hungary dataset
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Figure 6.8: Zipf’s law for the mixture of malicious and non-malicious flow size difference
of: (a) ISCX 2012 (13/6/2010) (b) ISCX 2012 (14/6/2010).
Table 6.5: Comparison between Zipf’s law and Benford’s law
Description Quantity Zipf’s law Benford’s law
divergence
P-value w-size 2000 w-size 10000
Malicious (M)
HONEYBOT 0.0000 0.35986 −
2009 CDX (dmp1) 0.0000 0.41638 −
2009 CDX (dmp2) 0.0000 0.53069 −
Non-Malicious (N)
LBNL/ICSI 0.3080 0.06086 0.02335
TLERH 0.1303 0.06206 0.04680
Mixture of N + M
ISCX 2012 (13/6/2010) 0.0000 0.37707 0.20355
ISCX 2012 (14/6/2010) 0.0000 0.20078 0.10629
sizes (w-size). For the Zipf’s law, we expect the P-values for the non-malicious
datasets to be greater than 0.1 and those for the malicious datasets to be lower
than 0.1. Based on our experimental Zipf’s law results, we observe that the
non-malicious datasets have P-values that are relatively larger as compared to
the P-values obtained from the malicious dataset. However, for the Benford’s
law, we expect the Chi-square divergence values for non-malicious dataset to be
relatively smaller and the Chi-square divergence values for the malicious dataset
to be relatively larger. We observe that the Benford’s law Chi-square divergence
values obtained agree with the expected result.
Based on our experimental results as shown in Table 6.5, the initial Zipf’s law
P-values obtained seem to be inversely proportional to the Benford’s law Chi-
square divergence values. However, as only a few P-values are obtained, more
results from other datasets would be needed before this assumption could be gen-
eralised. The implication of these results is that when Zipf’s law and Benford’s
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law are deployed in the same network environment to detect malicious traffic on
the Internet, higher Zipf’s law P-values and lower Benford’s law Chi-square di-
vergence values would be expected for normal network traffic. Conversely, when
a malicious attack is taking place, the opposite conditions for both natural laws
would occur, triggering an alert to the network administrator to perform a fur-
ther investigation to determine the exact cause of the attack.
Even though, we cannot fairly compare our Benford’s law IDS detection results
with other existing methods, we choose two closely related methods for compari-
son. This is due to many well-known and complicated issues around performance
evaluation of IDSs [38] [214] [215]. The only work on Benford’s law flow-based
IDS we could find is due to Arshadi and Jahangir [31] who showed that the
inter-arrival time of two consecutive normal TCP flows follows the Benford’s law
closely so an IDS can be built on top of this fact. They conducted some manual
inspection on selected malicious flows, but did not build an actual IDS so its
actual performance is unclear. Arshadi and Jahangir also studied the source of
Benford’s law and attributed it to the fact that normal TCP flows’ inter-arrival
time closely follows the Weibull distribution, which can derive Benford’s law. Our
work has an advantage over [31] because the inspection of malicious flows was
performed manually and the performance of the method was not clearly stated.
In [222], Arshadi and Jahangir also studied using the Weibull distribution for
modelling the inter-arrival time for IDS purposes, and provide some results on
the actual performance of such an IDS. However, the work in [222] differs from
our approach because it is not directly based on the Benford’s law but Weibull
distribution for modelling the inter-arrival time.
6.9 Summary
In this chapter, we applied and analysed Power laws (Benford’s law and Zipf’s
law) to detect malicious traffic on the Internet. We showed that the Benford’s law
and Zipf’s law could be used effectively to detect whether a particular network was
non-malicious or malicious by investigating its data using these laws. We showed
that the average divergence values for non-malicious datasets were relatively low
between the range of 0.00321 to 0.08954 as compared to malicious datasets with
values between the range of 0.10674 to 3.59944. Moreover, the Zipf’s law P-
values for non-malicious datasets were shown to follow the Zipf’s law, whereas
the Zipf’s law P-values for malicious datasets did not follow this law. P-values
of non-malicious datasets were 0.1303 and 0.3080 as compared to P-values of
malicious datasets which were 0.0000 for all the datasets investigated. We used
a simple threshold-based IDS scheme without the need to train the classifier. We
detected malicious traffic on the Internet with an AUC which was between the
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range of 0.6858 to 1. By comparing these two laws, we observed that the initial
Zipf’s law P-values obtained seem to be inversely proportional to the Benford’s
law Chi-square divergence values.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis has focused on an investigation of power laws to biometrics, forensics
and network traffic analysis. We have shown that the Benford’s law features can
detect and localise tampering in JPEG biometric images. Furthermore, we have
shown that the Benford’s law divergence values can detect and classify differ-
ent types of fingerprint images. Also, we have demonstrated that the Benford’s
law and Zipf’s law can be used on the latency of keystroke data to discriminate
between humans using keystroke biometric systems from non-humans. In this
thesis, we have also shown that the power laws (Benford’s law and Zipf’s law)
can assist in detecting malicious traffic on the Internet.
The novelty of this thesis is based on the fact that the power laws are inves-
tigated in different domains (biometrics, forensic and network traffic analysis)
and in each case, these laws successfully detected and/or separated malicious
data from non-malicious data. The following paragraphs presents the merits of
this thesis.
In Chapter 3, we proposed a novel use of Benford’s law for raw biometric images.
With this approach we could:
 Verify the integrity and authenticity of raw biometric images
 Protect against malicious tampering of stored raw biometric images
Chapter 4 proposed an interesting approach based on using the Benford’s law
divergence for classification and source identification of fingerprint images. This
approach could protect against intentional (attack) or unintentional mixture of
fingerprint images of different types in a fingerprint database.
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An investigation of power laws (Benford’s law and Zip’s law) for keystroke dy-
namics is proposed in Chapter 5. Without training this approach can differentiate
the behaviour between humans and non-human beings using keystroke biometric
systems. This could assist administrators in handling the large volumes of log-
ging data sets generated from employees of a particular company/organistaion.
In Chapter 6, we proposed the use of power laws on flow size difference of network
traffic data for IDS purposes. This could be used to detect malicious traffic on
the Internet using the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law.
7.1 Future Work
In this section, we present areas covered in this thesis for various research future
work.
7.1.1 Combining Benford’s law and Zipf’s law
Results in this thesis showed that the Benford’s law and Zipf’s law separately
achieved good results. Combining these two laws could further improve the per-
formance for detecting tampered raw JPEG biometric images. Also, by combin-
ing these two laws, the performance of detecting malicious traffic on the Internet
could be improved in terms of accuracy.
7.1.2 Power laws investigation for mixture of network traffic data
In Chapter 6, we discussed that the two power laws could not clearly distinguish
the non-malicious network traffic and mixture of malicious and non-malicious net-
work traffic. As such further work is needed to improve the power law techniques
to accurately distinguish these two network traffic cases.
7.1.3 Power laws and Active Forensic Analysis
Another research area for consideration is to investigate and apply the power laws
(Benford’s law and Zipf’s law) as an active forensic tool. The aim is to deploy
these laws directly on the network as the traffic passes through the router of the
network to detect the presence or absence of malicious attacks.
7.1.4 Anti-forensic Techniques
Recent research into anti- and anti-anti forensics techniques have attracted a
great deal of attention and more research is needed to focus on such techniques
for raw biometric modalities which could be potentially used to fool biometric
recognition systems.
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